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The Catholic Church is coping with mass tort liability for sexual abuse 
of children by priests.  As of September 2018, eighteen Catholic 
organizations have filed for relief in bankruptcy.  Fifteen debtors have 
emerged from bankruptcy after settling with sexual abuse claimants and 
insurers.  During settlement negotiations, sexual abuse claimants and 
debtors clashed over the extent of the debtors’ property and ability to pay 
claims.  Although such disputes are common in Chapter 11 plan 
negotiations, the Catholic cases required the parties and bankruptcy courts 
to account for the unique religious attributes of Catholic diocesan debtors.  
This Article reviews the arguments and outcomes on these issues based on 
reported decisions, pleadings, plans, and disclosure statements.  It explains 
the key characteristics of Catholic dioceses under canon and secular 
organization law and the bankruptcy contexts in which these characteristics 
became hot-button issues.  It offers an analysis of the legacy of the Catholic 
cases for bankruptcy law, religious liberty, and for the relationships among 
entities within a Catholic diocese. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2002, the Boston Globe reported that a former priest of the 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, John J. Geoghan, had been accused 
by more than 130 people of sexually abusing children since the mid-1990s.1  
Boston Archbishop Cardinal Bernard Law and five other bishops knew of 
credible accusations against Geoghan, but did nothing to warn the faithful or 
bar Geoghan from unsupervised access to children.2  Six months after the 
story broke, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 
acknowledged responsibility for failure to protect children from clergy 
 
 1  See Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priests for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 
6, 2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-
abuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html; see also Key Stories from 
the Boston Globe Spotlight Team Reporting on Clergy Abuse in the Catholic Church, BOS. 
GLOBE (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2015/11/10/timeline-spotlight-report-
stories/SGm67HGOQ7PolOSGZHxs8K/story.html.  The Boston Globe investigative series 
won the 2003 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service.  See The Boston Globe, PULITZER PRIZES, 
http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/boston-globe-1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).  The series 
became the basis of the 2015 film “Spotlight.”  See generally SPOTLIGHT (Open Road Films 
2015). 
 2  See DAVID FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN 
AGE OF SCANDAL 129–48 (2004).  In 2002, Geoghan was convicted and “sentenced to nine to 
[ten] years in prison” for indecent assault and battery against a ten-year-old boy that occurred 
in 1991.  Sex Abuse Priest Killed in Prison, CNN (Feb. 23, 2004), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/24/geoghan/index.html.  He was killed in prison by a fellow 
inmate in 2004.  Id. 
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sexual abuse.3  As it turned out, the problem was not limited to the 
Archdiocese of Boston. 
In July 2004, after efforts to settle multiple sexual abuse claims 
collapsed, the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon became the first Catholic 
organization to seek bankruptcy protection.4  Elizabeth Warren (then a law 
professor) expressed surprise that a Catholic archbishop would be willing to 
undergo the loss of privacy and control required of debtors in bankruptcy.5  
In retrospect, however, the resort to bankruptcy by the Archdiocese of 
Portland and the seventeen Catholic dioceses and religious institutes that 
have followed it into bankruptcy is not surprising.  Sexual abuse of children 
 
 3  See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 1 (2002), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/res 
ource-files/churchdocs/DallasCharter.pdf (“[T]he ways in which we bishops addressed these 
crimes and sins, have caused enormous pain, anger, and confusion.”); see also Raymond C. 
O’Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2004) (“It 
appeared as if the Church had isolated itself from the state’s concern for children, an isolation 
which appeared arrogant and even sinister.”); Associated Press, Scandals in the Church: 
Statement by President of the U.S. Catholic Bishops on Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/us/scandals-church-statement-president-us-
catholic-bishops-sexual-abuse.html (“We did not go far enough to ensure that every child and 
minor was safe from sexual abuse. . . .  Both what we have done or what we have failed to do 
contributed to the sexual abuse of children and young people by clergy and church 
personnel.”).  
 4  See Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Or. 
2010).  The Archdiocese of Portland filed for bankruptcy on the eve of jury selection in a civil 
sexual abuse trial involving its alleged negligent supervision of a priest who was accused of 
abusing more than fifty boys between 1950 and 1980.  See Laurie Goodstein, Oregon 
Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/us/oregon-archdiocese-files-for-bankruptcy-protection. 
html.  Four years earlier, the Archbishop of Portland, John Vlazny, had publicly apologized 
for the sexual abuse of children by the Archdiocese’s priests.  See Doe 130, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1129–30.  In the year before bankruptcy, the Archdiocese paid more than $21 million to 
settle sexual abuse claims.  See Letter from John G. Vlazny, Archbishop of Portland, 
Archdiocese of Portland in Or., to Brothers and Sisters in Christ (July 6, 2004), 
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/ia-davenport/bankruptcy/2004-07-06-Vlazny-Letter.ht 
m; see also Goodstein, supra. 
 5  See Michael Paulson, Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy, SUN-SENTINEL (July 7, 2004), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2004-07-07/news/0407070083_1_diocese-bankruptcy-court; 
see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2003) 
(noting that rumors that the Archdiocese of Boston might file for bankruptcy took him by 
surprise); Pam Belluck & Adam Liptak, For Boston Archdiocese, Bankruptcy Would Have 
Drawbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/03/us/for-boston-
archdiocese-bankruptcy-would-have-drawbacks.html (quoting bankruptcy scholar Jay 
Westbrook that “[f]or the Archdiocese of Boston to [file for bankruptcy] would be stunning”).  
A bankruptcy filing requires the debtor to open its books to creditors, the courts, and the 
public, and to be subject to court supervision and public scrutiny of its financial affairs and 
business operations.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (2018) (allowing creditors to question 
the debtor under oath, and challenge the accuracy and completeness of the debtor’s 
disclosure); id. § 1112(b)(1), (4)(G) (stating that failure to comply is grounds for dismissal of 
the case). 
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by priests had become a mass tort problem for Catholic organizations, and 
Chapter 11 was the obvious legal response.6 
The Catholic bankruptcy cases put a legal spotlight on the secular and 
ecclesiastical relationships between a diocesan debtor and the parishes, 
schools, cemeteries, and other entities that operate within the diocese and 
under the bishop’s authority.  Although fights about the nature and value of 
a debtor’s property are common in Chapter 11 cases, Catholic dioceses are 
not ordinary debtors.  Skirmishes between sexual abuse creditors and the 
debtors were unusually aggressive and public.  Advocates for sexual abuse 
claimants stoked the media with plans “to go after . . . parish assets.”7  One 
attorney described the push to include parish assets as a “‘slugfest’ [that] 
must occur ‘before people get serious’ about settlement.”8  The Catholic 
debtors pushed back, seeking protection from bankruptcy court-adjudication 
of property of the estate on religious freedom grounds.  They also argued 
that the property rights subject to their bankruptcy cases did not include 
property that they attributed to parishes and other diocesan affiliates under 
secular and religious law. 
 
 
 6  By 2004, reorganization in bankruptcy was a common corporate response to mass tort 
liability.  See Susan Chandler, Oregon Archdiocese Takes a Page from Corporate Playbook, 
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 1, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-01/business/04080100 
31_1_portland-archdiocese-portland-archbishop-john-vlazny-bankruptcy-judge-elizabeth-pe 
rris (analogizing sex abuse claims to asbestos claims); see also Francis E. McGovern, The 
Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2002) (noting that bankruptcy 
is the only way an asbestos defendant could achieve complete and final disposition of claims); 
Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 93, 95 (2004) (noting that use of bankruptcy by companies with asbestos liability had 
become “routine,” and predicting use of bankruptcy as response to non-asbestos mass tort 
issues).   
 7  Annysa Johnson, Parishes’ Assets Targeted in Archdiocese Bankruptcy Case, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/religion/parishes-
assets-targeted-in-archdiocese-bankruptcy-case-tf79a59-174875991.html (“Lawyers for 
sexual abuse victims . . . telegraphed [that] they intend to go after individual parish assets and 
proceeds from the Archdiocese’s $105 million Faith in Our Future campaign.”); see also 
Attorneys Want Diocese to Claim Ownership, SIOUX CITY J. (Oct. 25, 2006), 
http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/attorneys-want-diocese-to-claim-owner 
ship/article_9b3d7893-3846-5949-8a5b-859e80ece7dd.html (reporting that lawyers for 
sexual abuse claimants said that separately incorporated parishes should contribute their 
property to pay claims, and that they “believe the bishop controls the parishes”); Goodstein, 
supra note 4. 
 8  E.g., Donald L. Swanson, Don’t Let This Happen to You: Milwaukee Archdiocese 
Bankruptcy - Part Three: The In-Court “Slugfest,” MEDIATBANKRY (May 5, 2016), 
https://mediatbankry.com/2016/05/05/dont-let-this-happen-to-you-milwaukee-archdiocese-
bankruptcy-part-three-the-in-court-slugfest/; see also Listecki v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 496 B.R. 905, 912 (E.D. Wis. 2013) 
(noting that decision regarding the fate of the Cemetery Trust litigation “will shape the course 
of future proceedings in bankruptcy”), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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As of September 2018, of the eighteen organizations that filed for 
bankruptcy protection, fifteen (seven dioceses, six archdioceses, and two 
religious institutes) have emerged from bankruptcy after confirming 
consensual plans.9  The Archdiocese of San Diego settled with its creditors 
and dismissed its Chapter 11 case about six months after filing.10 
This Article considers the arguments and outcomes on property issues 
in the Catholic bankruptcy cases.  Part II explains the unique legal 
characteristics of Catholic dioceses as debtors in bankruptcy under canon 
law and secular organizational law.  Part III explains the conflicts between 
advocates for sexual abuse creditors and the debtors over the nature and 
extent of the debtors’ property.  Part IV considers the contexts and outcomes 
of litigation about the debtors’ right to religious liberty under the First 
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  Part V 
looks briefly at the issues that arose in the battle of competing plans in the 
Saint Paul and Minneapolis case.  Part VI reflects on the effects of the 
Catholic diocesan bankruptcy cases on bankruptcy law, religious liberty, and 
the relationships among bishops, dioceses, parishes and other entities within 
the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. 
II. CATHOLIC DIOCESES AS DEBTORS 
A. Canon Law 
Bankruptcy cases of non-profit religious organizations are not 
unusual.11  The Catholic diocesan debtors, however, are unique among non-
profit organizations in bankruptcy because of their affiliation with the 
Catholic Church.  The Church is a worldwide community established over 
two thousand years ago by Jesus Christ with about 1.25 billion members who 
hold a common religious creed.12  The 1983 Code of Canon Law (“canon 
 
 9  See Marie T. Reilly & Rebecca A. Mattson, Catholic Dioceses in Bankruptcy, PENN 
STATE LAW ELIBRARY, https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/bankruptcy/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) 
(archive of plans, disclosure statements, and other selected documents collected from public 
dockets in the Catholic bankruptcy cases). 
 10  Id. 
 11  See Pamela Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277 (2014); 
Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1319 (2015). 
 12  See U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 862 (2d 
ed. 2000); The Pontifical Yearbook 2017 and the “Annuarium Statiscum Ecclesiae” 2015, 
HOLY SEE PRESS OFF. BULL. (June 4, 2017), http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/boll 
ettino/pubblico/2017/04/06/170406e.html; Michael Lipka, A Closer Look at Catholic 
America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/09/14/a-closer-look-at-catholic-america/ (about twenty percent of adults residing 
in the United States report that their primary religious affiliation is Roman Catholic); Cindy 
Wooden, Global Catholic Population Tops 1.28 Billion; Half Are in 10 Countries, NAT’L 
CATH. REP. (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/global-catholic-
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law”) governs the conduct of all Catholics.13  It establishes the internal 
organizational structure and procedures of the Catholic Church and the 
property rights and agency relationships of entities within the Church.14 
Canon law describes the Catholic Church as a complete community.15  
Yet, the Church operates within a distinct secular community, which is 
subject to secular law.  Canon law acknowledges secular law and requires 
that Catholics must comply with it, except for secular laws that are contrary 
to divine law16 or when canon law expressly supersedes it.17  For example, 
canon law expressly supersedes civil law on the right of the Church to preach 
the Gospel and to “announce moral principles, even about the social 
order . . . .”18  Conversely, canon law adopts secular law on certain matters, 
including general and specific regulations on contracts and payments subject 
to divine law or conflicting canon law.19  As to most of the matters that 
secular law regulates, however, canon law is silent.20  In particular, canon 
law has nothing to say about the rights of creditors of Catholic organizations 
against the organizations or their property. 
The Catholic Church is not a universal, monolithic corporate 
organization.  Nor is it a Pope-led kingdom with absolute, downward 
hierarchy, as many suppose.  The Church operates through a central leader, 
the Pope, and through its “particular churches,” regional entities including 
 
population-tops-128-billion-half-are-10-countries. 
 13  See generally 1983 CODE C.11 (ecclesiastical law binding on all baptized Catholics 
over seven years of age).  Catholics are also bound by divine law, revealed in scripture or 
tradition.  Id. C.750.  Catholics who follow the Eastern Rite follow the 1990 Code of Canons 
of the Eastern Churches.  See generally CODE OF CANONS OF THE EASTERN CHURCHES (1990), 
https://orthocath.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/1990_code_of_canons_of_the_eastern_churc
hes.pdf. 
 14  See 1983 CODE C.96–144; id. C.330-572; id. C.1259–1310.   
 15  See Jacques Maritain, The Catholic Church and Social Progress, FOREIGN AFF. (July 
1, 1939), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1939-07-01/catholic-church-and-social-
progress. 
 16  Divine law, also known as natural law, is law enacted by God and made known to man 
through revelation.  See generally JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE 
TRADITION FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1999); Moral Aspect of Divine Law, NEW ADVENT, 
www.newadvent.org/cathen/09071a.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 17  See 1983 CODE C.22. 
 18  See, e.g., id. C.747, § 1 (“The Church . . . has the duty and innate right, independent of 
any human power whatsoever, to preach the gospel to all peoples.”). 
 19  See id. C.1290.  The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides that Catholics are 
morally bound to observe legitimate secular laws but must disobey laws that are “contrary to 
the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or the teachings of the 
Gospel.”  U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 541 c.2242 
(2d ed. 2016); see also NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 84 (John P. Beal et 
al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW].  
 20  NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 85.   
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archdioceses, dioceses, parishes, and religious institutes.21  Dioceses are 
geographic areas.22  An archdiocese is a large diocese23 in terms of the 
numbers of Catholics residing within it, and usually covers a large 
metropolitan area.24  Residing and operating within the geographic 
boundaries of a diocese are communities of Catholic faithful known as 
parishes.25  Religious institutes are groups of individuals (e.g., priests, nuns, 
brothers) who undertake certain vows and agree to live in community with 
other members under a common order or tradition.26  A religious institute 
operates independently of a diocese, however, on religious matters, 
individual members are subject to the authority of the bishop of the diocese 
in which they reside.27 
Canon law recognizes corporate agency for entities distinct from the 
persons who comprise them.28  Indeed, corporate agency as a legal construct 
may have originated in early Roman Catholic canon law.29  Canon law calls 
 
 21  See 1983 CODE C.368–430.  The most common form of a particular church is a diocese.  
NEW COMMENTARY ON CANNON LAW, supra note 19, at 506. 
 22  See 1983 CODE C.369 (a diocese is “a portion of the people of God which is entrusted 
[for pastoral care] to a bishop . . .”); see also Diocese and Bishop Addresses, U.S. CONF. OF 
CATH. BISHOPS, www.usccb.org/about/bishops-and-dioceses/all-dioceses.cfm (last visited 
March 1, 2019) (listing of archdioceses and dioceses in the U.S.) 
 23  Hereafter, unless the context indicates, “diocese” refers to archdiocese or diocese. 
 24  An archdiocese may also be referred to as a “metropolitan see.”  A “see” is an 
ecclesiastical province that includes the archdiocese and “suffrage” dioceses within the 
ecclesiastical province that are also under the authority of the archbishop.  See 1983 CODE 
C.431, § 1, C.435, C.436.  An archbishop has authority over his own diocese and as the head 
of the metropolitan see has certain responsibilities to the suffrage dioceses within the see.  See 
id. C.473, §1.  For example, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York is the metropolitan 
see of the ecclesiastical province of New York which includes the suffragan dioceses of 
Albany, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Ogdensburg, Rochester, Rockville Centre and Syracuse.  See 
Ecclesiastical Province, Catholic Dioceses in United States of America, GCATHOLIC.ORG, 
http://www.gcatholic.org/dioceses/country/US-province.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).  
Each diocese is a “particular church” within the “universal church.”  1983 CODE C.368; see 
also JOHN J. COUGHLIN, CANON LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL THEORY 118 (2011).  Along with dioceses, juridic entities such as territorial prelatures, 
abbacies, apostolic vicarates, and prefactures are also “particular churches.”  1983 CODE 
C.368; see also HENRI DE LUBAC, Particular Churches in the Universal Church, in THE 
MOTHERHOOD OF THE CHURCH 191–211 (Sergia Englund trans., 1983). 
 25  See 1983 CODE C.515, § 1 (“A parish is a certain community of the Christian faithful 
stably constituted in a particular church”); id. C.374, § 1 (“Every diocese . . . is . . . divided 
into parishes”). 
 26  See id. C.607, § 2.  See generally Sister Cecilia Meighan, Religious Institutes—
Property and Tax Issues, 33 CATH. LAW. 25 (1990).  Some religious institutes are authorized 
by the pope (known as “pontifical right” institutes), and are thus under the authority of the 
pope rather than the bishop of the geographic diocese in which the institute is located.  Id. at 
25–26. 
 27  See 1983 CODE C.678, § 1; see also id. C.680 (providing for cooperation among 
institutes and between institute and diocesan clergy under the direction of the bishop). 
 28  See NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 154–55.   
 29  See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE 
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entities with such agency “juridic persons.”30 Dioceses, and diocesan-
affiliated entities such as parishes, schools, cemeteries, special purpose trusts 
are all public juridic persons with distinct agency under canon law.31 
With respect to property rights, canon law recognizes a distinction 
between ecclesiastical property (the Church’s property) and non-
ecclesiastical property.  “[O]wnership of goods belongs to that juridic person 
which has acquired them legitimately.”32  All property legitimately acquired 
by a public juridic person is ecclesiastical property, whereas property 
acquired by individual persons is not.33  For example, a monetary 
contribution by an individual to his or her parish becomes ecclesiastical 
property once the parish, as juridic person, acquires it.34  Property that 
belongs to one juridic person cannot simultaneously belong to another juridic 
person.35 
A juridic person’s “ownership” of property is limited by canon law, 
which establishes a hierarchy of authority among juridic persons.  The 
authority of juridic persons within the Church is generally, but not perfectly, 
 
L.J. 655, 665 (1926) (attributing the legal concept of persona ficta to Pope Innocent IV who 
used it to afford monasteries continuous and separate existence from the monks). 
 30  See 1983 CODE C.113, § 2 (“[B]esides physical persons, there are also juridic persons, 
that is, subjects in canon law of obligations and rights which correspond to their nature.”).  
Juridic persons have the “innate right . . . to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal 
goods independently of civil power.”  Id. C.1254, § 1.  In contrast to a juridic person, a “moral 
person” is a group of individuals, or assets, with a common purpose but without a canonical 
legal personae distinct from the persons who comprise it.  See NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON 
LAW, supra note 19, at 154–55; see also 1983 CODE C.310 (A private association not 
established as a juridic person has no agency of its own, but individual members of the 
association can “jointly contract obligations and can acquire and possess rights and goods as 
co-owners and co-possessors”).  Goods held jointly by a private association are not 
“ecclesiastical goods” and are not subject to canonical norms regulating such goods.  See 1983 
CODE C.1257; id. C.515, § 3 (stating the same as to parishes); id. at C.373 (stating the same as 
to diocese); id. C.634, § 1 (stating the same as to religious orders); NEW COMMENTARY ON 
CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 408. 
 31  See 1983 CODE C.116, § 1.  A juridic person founded to serve the public good is a 
“public juridic person.”  Id.  Hereafter, all juridic persons within a diocese shall be referred to 
collectively as “parishes” for simplicity. 
 32  Id. C.1256. 
 33  See id. C.1257, § 1 (“All temporal goods which belong to the universal Church, the 
Apostolic See, or other public juridic persons in the Church are ecclesiastical goods and are 
governed by the following canons and their own statutes.”); see also id. C.1254–1310 
(regulating the purchase, ownership, administration, and sale of Church property by juridic 
persons to whom it belongs). 
 34  See id. C.1267, § 1 (offerings given to an administrator of a public juridic person are 
presumed to be offerings to the public juridic person the individual administers); id. C.1267, 
§ 3 (“Offerings given by the faithful can” only be used for the purpose for which they were 
given). 
 35  See ADAM J. MAIDA & NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES, 
AND CHURCH-RELATED CORPORATIONS: A CANON LAW HANDBOOK 26 (1983) (“[A]ll property 
is the property of one public juridic person or another.”). 
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hierarchical.  The Pope is the bishop of Rome, successor in that position to 
Saint Peter.36  The Pope appoints bishops for each diocese.37  The bishop has 
authority over each parish within the geographic boundaries of the diocese.38  
In turn, the bishop appoints a pastor, typically a priest, to manage a parish.39 
As noted above, canon law recognizes ownership of property in the 
juridic person who acquired it.40  At the same time, that property is typically 
administered by a juridic person senior in the hierarchy, for the benefit of the 
juridic person.41  The Pope has plenary authority over all ecclesiastical 
goods.42  The bishop is the administrator for property belonging to the 
diocese, the juridic person that the bishop administers.43  The bishop does 
not administer parish property—rather, a pastor (appointed by the bishop) 
“exercises direct power of governance” over the parish44 and administers the 
property belonging to the parish.45  The bishop’s role with respect to parish 
property is indirect through his authority over the pastor who administers it.  
The bishop is “to exercise careful vigilance over the administration of all 
goods which belong to public juridic persons subject to him . . . .”46 
 
 
 36  See Roman Catholicism: Structure of the Church, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-Catholicism/Structure-of-the-church (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2019). 
 37  1983 CODE C.377, § 1; Pope Paul VI, Christus Dominus: Decree Concerning the 
Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, HOLY SEE PRESS OFF. BULL. (Oct. 28, 1965), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decree_19651028_christus-dominus_en.html. 
 38  1983 CODE C.515. 
 39  Id. C.515, § 1 (“[P]astoral care is entrusted to a pastor . . .  under the authority of the 
diocesan bishop.”); see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 676 
(“[T]he diocesan bishop . . . has authority over the pastor of each parish [within the 
diocese].”). 
 40  1983 CODE C.1256. 
 41  Id. c.1279, § 1; see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1474. 
 42  The Pope is the “supreme administrator and steward of all ecclesiastical goods.”  1983 
CODE C.1273. 
 43  NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1477. 
 44  1983 CODE C.532; THE CANON LAW SOC’Y OF GR. BRIT. & IR., THE CANON LAW 
LETTER AND SPIRIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CODE OF CANON LAW 295 (Gerard Sheehy & 
Francis G. Morrisey eds.,1996).  
 45  1983 CODE C.531, C.1276, C.532; see also id. at C.515, § 1; NEW COMMENTARY ON 
CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1477. 
 46  1983 CODE C.1276, § 1.  The bishop designates certain transactions involving parish 
property by type or size as extraordinary, for which the pastor must obtain the bishop’s 
permission.  Id. C.1281.  Unlike parishes, religious institutes administer property outside the 
supervisory authority of the bishop of the diocese in which they are geographically located.  
Id. C.586, § 1 (acknowledging “a just autonomy of life, especially of governance . . . for 
individual institutes”).  Members of a religious institute, however, are subject to the bishop’s 
authority “in those matters which regard the care of souls, the public exercise of divine 
worship, and other works of the apostolate.”  Id. C.678, §1. 
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The Catholic bankruptcy cases opened wide the obvious tension 
between the independence of parishes from the bishop as distinct juridic 
persons and the bishop’s indirect authority over parishes and parish property.  
One commenter described the question of whether parishes “own” property 
as an example of how extreme interpretations of canon law are either as 
“antinomian” or “legalistic,” and concluded that to attempt to translate canon 
law hierarchical ownership rights into secular terms “disrupt[s] the unity of 
law and theology” expressed in canon law.47  Another commenter put the 
issue in much plainer terms, asserting that, under canon law, “[p]arishes are 
not plums for the diocesan bishop to pick when he has debts to pay.”48 
B. Organizational Law 
Not all Catholic dioceses are organized alike.  The differences among 
them became key issues in their bankruptcy cases.  State law varies on the 
corporate forms available to religious organizations.49  Depending on state 
law, Catholic organizations may choose among corporate forms, including 
charitable trusts, unincorporated associations, corporation sole, religious 
non-profit corporations, or general non-profit corporations.50 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, legislatures 
extended special corporate sole charters for religious organizations including 
Catholic dioceses, which otherwise could not incorporate.51  The corporation 
sole form places all the management control of the organization in a single 
person as agent for the corporation sole, e.g., the bishop of a Catholic diocese 
and his successors.52  Like the ordinary non-profit corporate form, the 
 
 47  See COUGHLIN, supra note 24, at 176–79. 
 48  See, e.g., Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Availability of Parish Assets for Diocesan Debts: 
A Canonical Analysis, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361, 368 (2005).  
 49  See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 
1995 BYU L. REV. 439 (1995).  
 50  Id. at 441–42 (discussing that a 1995 survey revealed that eighty-seven percent of 
religious organizations chose “the religious not-for-profit corporate form”).  To qualify for 
tax-exempt status, a non-profit corporation’s organizing documents must ensure that the 
“members, officers, and directors . . . do not receive any profit” from the organization’s 
operations.  Id. at 442.  This “nondistribution constraint” is also required for federal tax-
exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code.  See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). 
 51  For example, Washington’s corporation sole statute was enacted in 1915 to provide a 
means for religious organizations to hold title to property distinctly from their members and 
enjoy perpetual existence.  Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re 
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub 
nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of 
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006). 
 52  Statutes typically provide that the sole manager of the corporation must have been duly 
elected or chosen, and must act in accordance with the rules of the organization of which the 
manager is a part.  MAIDA & CAFARDI, supra note 35, at 128; see also Tort Claimants Comm. 
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corporate sole form permits the survival of the corporation in perpetuity and 
continuous ownership of property.53  The corporate sole form is loosely 
consistent with the bishop’s supervisory responsibility over parishes and 
other juridic persons within the diocese, but it is inconsistent with 
recognition of parishes as juridic persons with the agency to own property 
distinct from the bishop.54 
In the 1980’s as state legislatures extended corporate status to non-
profit religious corporations, canonists considered whether the corporate sole 
form continued to be appropriate, and, if so, whether parishes within 
corporation sole dioceses should separately incorporate and hold title to the 
property that canon law attributed to them.  Advocates for the status quo 
(diocese as corporation sole with centralized title to property) lauded it as an 
efficient means for the bishop to use parish property as collateral for diocesan 
or parish projects at capital costs more favorable than could be achieved by 
individual parishes borrowing against parish property.55  An author of a 
handbook on Church property and finance opined that a Catholic diocese 
could be organized variously as a corporation sole, a non-profit religious 
corporation, or as an entity without corporate form.  He offered no guidance 
for a bishop to choose among these forms, or how the diocese and its parishes 
should hold title to property within the secular corporate structure he chose.56  
He opined blithely that secular law was irrelevant.  Secular courts would 
apply canon law to supply the terms of implied trusts in favor of parishes 
“because it is that law which governs the use of these Church assets.”57  No 
doubt, the author was unconcerned about the prospect of diocesan 
bankruptcy cases. 
 
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Portland in Or.), 345 B.R. 686, 697 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (finding a distinction between the 
Archdiocese of Portland and the “office of the Archbishop” for purposes of interpretation of 
an express trust, as the former is the corporate entity whereas the latter is the ecclesiastical 
office of the Archbishop under Canon law); Gerstenblith, supra note 49, at 454 (noting that, 
as of 1995, twenty-six states permitted incorporation of a religious organization as a 
corporation sole).  
 53  See, e.g., Cty. of San Luis Obispo v. Ashurst, 194 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1983) (“The 
creditors of the corporation sole may not look to the assets of the individual holding office, 
nor may the creditors of the individual look to the assets held by the corporation sole.”); see 
also Gerstenblith, supra note 49, at 455. 
 54  NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 164, 1457. 
 55  See R. Kealy, Methods of Diocesan Incorporation, CANON LAW SOC’Y OF AM. PROCS. 
163–77 (1986); see also, e.g., Baxter v. McDonnell, 49 N.E. 667, 668 (N.Y. 1898) (finding 
that where Catholic bishop held title to an unincorporated church in his name, “[t]he purpose 
of this arrangement is to exclude the laity from that power of interference which they would 
have were the title vested in a corporation”). 
 56  See Kealy, supra note 55, at 163–77.  In any case, the bishop holds title to parish assets 
“in accordance with canon law . . . as civil law trustee for the parish . . . [under] an amalgam 
of these individual parish trusts.”  Id. 
 57  Id. at 131 (citing 1983 CODE C.1257). 
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Today, in light of the clergy sexual abuse scandal, the financial 
advantages of bishop-centered control over property have disappeared, 
swamped by the liability risk.  In 2000, two years before the Archdiocese of 
Boston scandal broke, canon law scholars noted that organization of a 
diocese as a corporation sole with centralized title to property, and without 
separate incorporation of parishes, is “[i]ncompatible with the law of the 
Church [and] long ago disapproved by the Holy See.”58  Perhaps wryly, they 
noted that bishops and their financial officers and advisers “should make 
every effort to see that the laws of the Church . . . are faithfully followed.”59 
As Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have 
recognized, organizational law defines the set of assets to which an 
organization’s creditors have recourse and shields from those creditors other 
property not within that set.60  Unlike canon law, which governs rights and 
relationships among juridic persons within the Church, a bankruptcy 
proceeding reveals the external effect of secular organizational law on the 
organization’s creditors.  In no other legal setting is scrutiny of 
organizational form, property rights, and agency more energetically 
undertaken. 
III. PARISH PROPERTY AS PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
A. Property of the Estate Basics 
Consider the importance of property of the estate issues in bankruptcy 
cases generally.  In a Chapter 7 case, the trustee for the estate marshals, 
liquidates, and distributes property of the estate to creditors in satisfaction of 
the debtor’s pre-petition debts61  In contrast, in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor 
and creditors engage in bankruptcy court-supervised negotiation towards a 
plan of reorganization that can preserve at least some of the debtor’s going 




 58  NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 164 (footnote omitted). 
 59  Id. at 164, 1457.   
 60  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390  (2000) (“[T]he essential role of all forms of organizational law is to 
provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’—that 
could not practicably be established otherwise.” (footnote omitted)). 
 61  See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2018) (claims allowance process); id. § 506 (secured claims); id. 
§ 507 (priority among unsecured creditors); id. § 725 (distribution of property to holders of 
secured claims; id. § 726 (priority of distribution of property of the estate.). 
 62  See Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Aug. 15, 
2018). 
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Property of the estate issues frame negotiation among the parties in a 
Chapter 11 case.63  Among other requirements, to confirm a plan of 
reorganization over the objection of a creditor, a Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization must provide a payout to the objecting creditor with a present 
value at least equal to the payout that creditor would receive upon liquidation 
of property of the estate in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case.64  This 
confirmation requirement is called the “best interest test.”  It protects a 
dissenting creditor from the consequences of a Chapter 11 plan if the plan 
payout is not in its “best interest’ relative to the alternative hypothetical 
Chapter 7 liquidation payout.65  To satisfy the requirement, the disclosure 
statement accompanying a plan must provide a hypothetical valuation of 
property of the estate so creditors can determine whether the plan satisfies 
the test.66  Given the best interest test, the more property included within the 
estate and the greater its value, the more leverage for unsecured creditors in 
the Chapter 11 plan negotiation.67 
The legal contexts in which property of the estate issues arose in the 
Catholic bankruptcy cases differed depending on the debtor’s organizational 
structure, the organizational structure of parishes within the diocese subject 
to the bishop’s canonical authority, and the respective rights of the debtors 
and parishes in property under secular law. 
Filing a petition in bankruptcy creates an estate that includes, with 
certain exceptions, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case.”68  Section 541 defines “[p]roperty of 
 
 63  To confirm a plan in a Chapter 11 case, the plan must meet the requirements of § 1129.  
If the debtor is a non-profit corporation, any “transfers of property under the plan shall be 
made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the 
transfer of property.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2018). 
 64  Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 65  Id.  A Chapter 11 plan proponent ordinarily must include a hypothetical liquidation 
analysis in the disclosure statement accompanying the plan so that creditors can determine if 
the proposed plan is in their best interest.  Id. § 1125(b) (to solicit votes on a plan, the plan 
proponent must provide a disclosure statement containing “adequate information”); In re 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 04-37154, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1180, at 
*19–20 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007) (finding that the plan provided that the objecting 
creditors would be paid in full, so no hypothetical liquidation analysis was required); CHARLES 
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1123–24 (2d ed. 2009) (observing that most 
disclosure statements include a hypothetical liquidation analysis). 
 66  § 1125(a)–(b). 
 67  See, e.g., Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic 
Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. 
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort 
Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (“Resolution of this 
adversary proceeding in favor of the plaintiff would result in the debtor having more assets 
with which to pay the claims held by the members of the plaintiff.”). 
 68  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018) (“The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate . . . 
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the estate;” state law defines what rights qualify for the status of “a legal or 
equitable interest of the debtor in property.”69 
Although the definition of property of the estate in § 541 is 
straightforward, application of § 541 is complicated because property rights 
are complicated.  The general rule under bankruptcy law is that parties who 
hold rights in property of the estate maintain their rights notwithstanding the 
debtor’s bankruptcy.  For example, a creditor with a valid security interest in 
property of the estate with priority over the estate’s interest in that property 
under state law is generally entitled to priority of its interest over the estate’s 
interest in that property.70  Similarly, a third party who holds a valid 
beneficial interest in property subject to a trust under which the debtor holds 
legal title maintains that beneficial interest in property notwithstanding the 
debtor’s bankruptcy.  Only the debtor’s legal title to property becomes 
property of the estate; the third party’s beneficial interest in the property does 
not.71 
The Archdiocese of Portland and the Dioceses of Tucson, Spokane, San 
Diego, Fairbanks, Gallup, Stockton, Helena and Great Falls-Billings were 
organized as corporations sole at the time of their filings.72  Except for those 
within the Diocese of Stockton, the parishes were not separately 
incorporated.73  The respective bishops, as the lone agents for the 
 
comprised of all of the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: (1) 
[subject to certain exceptions,] all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of 
the commencement of the case.”).  The estate also includes property the trustee recovers by 
exercise of the statutory powers.  Id. § 541(a)(3), (4).  Section 541(b) excludes certain of the 
debtor’s property interests from the estate and thereby protects such interests from creditors’ 
claims.  Id. § 541(b).  Hereafter, all references to section numbers refer to Chapter 11 of the 
United States Code, unless otherwise indicated. 
 69  See id. § 541(a); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), superseded in part 
by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at 
11 U.S.C §§ 100–112 (2018)), as recognized in Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re 
Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 
335 B.R. 842, 854 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (noting that § 541 defines property of the estate, but 
state law defines what is property). 
 70  11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(1) (2018). 
 71  § 541(d) (“Property in which the debtor holds . . . only legal title . . . becomes property 
of the estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the 
extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.”); see, e.g., 
Hunter v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. (In re Parkview Hosp.), 211 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1997) (finding a fund that was subject to a charitable trust excluded from debtor’s estate under 
§ 541(d)).   
 72  See infra Appendix A: Case Information (listing corporate form for each debtor based 
on information provided by debtors in disclosure statements). 
 73  Id.  Although the Diocese of Stockton was organized as a corporation sole, each of the 
parishes were also organized as separate corporations sole.  See In re Roman Catholic Bishop 
of Stockton, No. 14-20371, 2017 WL 118013, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017); Debtor’s 
Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization at 12, In re Roman Catholic Bishop 
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corporations soles, were the record title holders to all ecclesiastical property 
without differentiation as to whether it “belonged” to the diocese or to the 
parishes under canon law. 
The Archdioceses of Milwaukee, Saint Paul and Minneapolis, and the 
Dioceses of Davenport, Wilmington, Stockton, Helena, Duluth, New Ulm, 
and Great Falls-Billings were organized as non-profit or religious 
corporations at the time of filing.74  Within these archdioceses and dioceses, 
parishes and other affiliated entities were separately incorporated and held 
record title to property.75  The three religious institute debtors, (Oregon 
Province, Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), Christian Brothers of Ireland, New 
York and Crosier Fathers and Brothers), were all organized as non-profit 
corporations.  One of these debtors, the Oregon Province, Society of the 
Jesus, was comprised of individual communities, many of which were not 
separately incorporated.76 
For debtors organized as corporations sole with title to property 
centralized in the bishop, the debtors asserted that they held only legal title 
to certain property in trust for parishes, schools, cemeteries or other juridic 
persons whose separate interests the bishop must safeguard and respect 
under canon law.  Sexual abuse claimants argued that state law and the 
Bankruptcy Code exclusively governed property rights, effectively stripping 
parishes of any rights in property formally titled in the bishop’s name, 
notwithstanding their beneficial “ownership” of property under canon law. 
Sexual abuse creditors used a reverse strategy in cases of debtors 
organized as religious corporations with separately incorporated parishes 
with their own legal title to property.  In these cases, the debtors did not 
include in their estates property titled in the names of separately incorporated 
parishes.  Sexual abuse creditors tried to capture parish property into the 
debtors’ estates using a variety of legal arguments, all of which elevated the 
substance of the bishop’s canonical authority over parishes and their 
 
of Stockson, No. 14-20371 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014); see also In re Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 849; Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese 
of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), 
aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-
0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub 
nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 
2006). 
 74  See infra Appendix A: Case Information. 
 75  Id.  Parishes within the Diocese of Stockton held title to property separately from the 
diocese.  Although the Diocese of Stockton was organized as a corporation sole, parishes 
within the diocese were organized separately as corporations sole yielding a decentralized 
property structure analogous to that in dioceses organized as religious corporations with 
separately incorporated parishes.  See In re Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, 2017 WL 
118013. 
 76  See Disclosure Statement Regarding First Modified Joint Plan of Reorganization at 
20–24, In re Soc’y of Jesus, Or. Province, No. 3:09-bk-30938 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011). 
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property over parishes’ independent corporate status and separate title to 
property under secular law. 
B. Corporations Sole 
Debtors organized as corporations sole listed in their schedules all 
property titled in the name of the bishop.  They asserted that the bishop’s 
title to property attributed to parishes under canon law was subject to a trust 
in favor of the parishes to whom the property belonged under canon law.  
Because parish property was subject to a trust in favor of the parishes, it was 
not included in the estate under § 541(d).77  For parishes (not separately 
incorporated) to hold a valid beneficial interest in property, however, they 
had to have the legal capacity to hold title to it. 
The Diocese of Tucson asserted that the closest analogy for the legal 
status of its parishes was unincorporated associations.78  The diocese noted 
that Arizona law does not recognize legal agency for an unincorporated 
association to own property and, for that reason, the diocese held title to 
parish property.79  Even so, it asserted, “the Diocese does not have any 
equitable, beneficial or proprietary interest in the Parish Real Property.”80 
Unsecured creditors’ committees representing sexual abuse claimants 
in both the Spokane and Portland cases objected to their respective debtor’s 
trust theories regarding parish property.81  In particular, they argued that the 
alleged trusts were invalid under state law and not entitled to respect under 
bankruptcy law.82  The stakes were high.  Attorneys for sexual abuse 
 
 77  In In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., the debtor asserted that, “although it holds legal 
title to approximately $98 million in deposits and investment accounts and an extensive 
amount of real estate, most of that property is held in trust.”  335 B.R. at 848.  In In re Catholic 
Bishop of Spokane, the debtor similarly asserted that, with certain exceptions, property listed 
on its schedules was held for the benefit of parishes, schools, cemeteries, and other diocesan 
entities.  329 B.R. at 310.  The Diocese of Spokane explained in its Statement of Financial 
Affairs that the diocese “has no equitable beneficial or proprietary interest in this [parish] 
property, but, in some cases, holds mere legal title[,]” and also that some property “is subject 
to a restriction imposed by the donor or grantor.”  Id.  
 78  Third Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization 
at 31, In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 4:04-bk-04721-JMM 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id.  
 81  See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025, at *3–4 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006); In re Archbishop of 
Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 848.  In Catholic Diocese of Spokane, the district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the tort claimants’ committee had standing to challenge 
by adversary action the debtor’s characterization of property of the estate.  2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6025, at *15.   
 82  In In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., the sexual abuse claimants’ committee sought 
a declaration that property listed on the debtors’ schedules was “held in trust” for parishes 
was property of the estate free of any third-party interests.  335 B.R. at 848.  In In re Catholic 
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claimants in the Portland case estimated that including property the debtor 
attributed to trusts in favor of 124 diocesan parishes and schools would yield 
an estate of about $500 million dollars compared to assets valued at about 
$19 million which debtor had scheduled as property of the estate.83 
In both cases, the parishes organized into informal committees with 
standing to intervene in the adversary actions over property of the estate.84  
In the Spokane case, parishes contended that the diocese held the disputed 
property in a constructive trust either for their benefit or for the benefit of 
individual parishioners.85  The court rejected the contention that parishioners 
could hold a beneficial interest in parish property.  Even though parishioners 
made gifts to their parishes with the understanding that the parish would use 
the gifts exclusively for the parish, the donor parishioners acquired no 
property interest in the gifted property.86  As to whether parishes could be 
beneficiaries of a constructive trust, the threshold question was the legal 
status of parishes as entities distinct from the debtor.  The bankruptcy court 
assumed without deciding that the parishes were distinct legal entities.87  
Even so, there could be no constructive trust in favor of parishes because the 
deeds that named the bishop as sole title holder were the exclusive source of 
evidence of title.  The court declined to consider the affidavit evidence from 
pastors, parishioners, and other benefactors in support of a constructive trust 
for parishes.88  It entered partial summary judgment in favor of the creditors’ 
 
Bishop of Spokane, the committee challenged the debtors’ characterization of twenty-two 
parcels of real property as held in trust for parishes, and moved for an order consolidating the 
non-debtor defendants with the debtor.  329 B.R. at 310–11. 
 83  See Steve Woodward, Class Action Possible in Church Case, OREGONIAN (May 26, 
2005), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2005_01_06/2005_05_26_Woodward_Cl 
assAction.htm; see also Joe Feuerherd, Portland Bankruptcy Seen as High-Risk Strategy, 
NAT’L CATH. REP. (July 30, 2004) (noting that archdiocesan attorneys reported at a hearing 
$100 million in investment accounts, most held for the accounts of parishes and affiliated 
entities).  In the Tucson case, the diocese was smaller (seventy-five parishes), but the 
differential was proportionately large.  Sexual abuse claimants estimated the value of property 
of the estate, including parish property, at $110 million dollars compared with $16 million 
listed by the diocese.  See Stephanie Innes, Diocese Files Bankruptcy, ARIZ. DAILY STAR 
(Sept. 21, 2004), https://tucson.com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/diocese-files-bankruptcy/artic 
le_87a37557-4fc0-5da5-b408-bef688bef24d.html; Stephanie Innes, Diocese Set to Split with 
Its Parishes, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/news2004_07_12/2004_09_23_Innes_DioceseSet.htm. 
 84  In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 848–49; In re Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 331; see also Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The Rights 
of Parishioners in Church Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REV. 75, 91–110 (2007). 
 85  In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 329 n.8.  
 86  Id. at 330 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. a, § 125, § 37 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 1959)). 
 87  Id. at 330–31; see also Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 
B.R. 81, 91 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (noting that the bankruptcy court’s assumption was “correct” 
and that “the Parishes are unincorporated associations”). 
 88  In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 331; see also In re Catholic Diocese of 
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committee, finding that the disputed parish real property was property of the 
estate free of any trust.89  Even if the parishes could establish a trust in their 
favor under Washington law, because constructive or resulting trusts are 
equitable remedies, the parishes’ interest was at best an “inchoate right” as 
of the filing of the petition and not a beneficial interest in property distinct 
from the estate’s interest.90  Finally, even if under Washington law a 
constructive or resulting trust was a property interest, it was unrecorded and 
therefore subject to the trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded interests under 
§ 544(a)(3).91  The decision was a stunning and significant setback for the 
Diocese of Spokane, and for Catholic dioceses organized as corporations 
sole with similarly centralized title to property.92 
Ten months later, the district court reviewing de novo reversed.93  It 
found issues of fact on the validity of a trust in favor of parishes under 
Washington law based on the distinction between constructive trust and a 
resulting trust.94  A constructive trust arises as a remedy for fraud by the title 
holder on the constructive trust beneficiary.95  In contrast, a resulting trust 
arises in favor of the person who paid to acquire property (the beneficiary) 
when a title to property is conveyed to a record title holder who is someone 
 
Spokane, 364 B.R. at 91 (noting that the bankruptcy court did not consider the affidavit 
testimony). 
 89  In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.   
 90  Id. at 332 (citing Airwork Corp. v. Markair Express, Inc. (In re Markair, Inc.), 172 
B.R. 638, 642 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)). 
 91  11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2018); In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333 
(recognizing that the debtor in possession can exercise the trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded 
interests in real property and that the court could grant derivative standing to exercise that 
power to the creditors’ committee).  The trustee’s strong arm power to avoid unperfected 
interests in property reinforces state law that requires public notice of non-possessory property 
interests (for example, real property recording laws and public filing requirements for 
personal property security interests).  See generally David Gray Carlson, The Trustee’s Strong 
Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. REV. 841 (1991). 
 92  See, e.g., Joe Feuerherd, Diocesan Bankruptcies Raise Church Ownership Issues, 
NAT’L CATH. REP. (Sept. 9, 2005), www.natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2005c/090905/0 
90905a.php (“The settlement dollars just went up dramatically . . . and the claimants hold all 
the cards.” (quoting Sam Gerdano, Exec. Dir. of the Am. Bankr. Inst.)); Seattle Times Staff, 
Bankruptcy Judge Rules Parish Assets Available to Victims, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 26, 2005), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/bankruptcy-judge-rules-parish-assets-available-
to-victims/ (reporting that “Barbara Blaine, president of the Survivors Network of those 
Abused by Priests (“SNAP”), said . . . that she hoped the ruling would prompt leaders of other 
dioceses to stop fighting victims”). 
 93  In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 91, 95. 
 94  Id. at 92–95. 
 95  E.g., Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank. v. Saloman Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250–51 
(2000) (“Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or under 
circumstances ‘which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and 
enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus 
acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same . . . .’” (quoting 2 
J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 103, 628-29 (1886). 
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other than that person (the trustee).96  Washington courts recognize a 
resulting trust based on the circumstances of the conveyance of title, and not 
exclusively based on the deed.97  The district court came close to calling the 
bankruptcy court’s disregard of the affidavit evidence the parishes had 
submitted absurd—if only the record of title is relevant as to whether 
property is subject to a resulting trust, then no resulting trust would ever 
arise.98 
The district court further held that a resulting trust could survive the 
trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded interests in real property under § 
544(a)(3).99  Under some states’ laws, the circumstances that give rise to a 
resulting trust may amount to constructive notice of the beneficiary’s 
interest, which as a matter of state law precludes the possibility of a bona 
fide purchaser.100  Section 544(a)(3) relieves the trustee from the effect of 
actual knowledge of an unrecorded interest, but does not relieve the trustee 
of the effect of constructive notice.101  The court held that summary judgment 
on this issue was inappropriate because of fact issues as to whether, under 
Washington law, the circumstances surrounding parishes’ acquisition of 
parish property constituted constructive notice of the parishes’ beneficial 
 
 96  In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 92–93 (citing Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 
908 (Wash. 1996)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 448 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1959) (describing circumstances in which a “resulting trust” arises). 
 97  In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 92 (citing Brown, 924 P.2d at 911–12). 
 98  Id. at 93, 95.  Moreover, if a resulting trust arose, it could be a property interest (and 
not merely an inchoate right) at the time of filing.  Under Washington law, a resulting trust 
arises at the time of the conveyance to the title holder and, unlike a constructive trust, does 
not depend on a court order.  Id. at 93 (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 327 
(2d ed. rev. 1979)). 
 99  Brown, 924 P.2d at 93 (citing In re Torrez, 827 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 100  For example, under California law, there can be no bona fide purchaser of property 
from the holder of legal title to property that is held subject to a resulting trust if the 
beneficiary’s possession of the property constitutes constructive notice of his equitable 
interest.  See, e.g., In re Weisman, 5 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that under 
California law, a trustee takes free of actual knowledge but not constructive notice, and that a 
trustee’s constructive notice of a prior interest precludes bona fide purchaser status); Brady v. 
Pohlman (In re Bittner), No. 08-43037, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2530, at * 12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
June 9, 2009) (holding that the trustee had constructive notice of a resulting trust and thus 
lacked bona fide purchaser status under 11. U.S.C. § 544(a)(3)). 
 101  See, e.g., Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 58, 73 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding under New York law, the trustee’s avoiding power under § 
544(a)(3) is subject to constructive notice).  A few courts have limited the trustee’s avoiding 
power under § 544(a)(3) against the holder of an implied equitable lien based on the equities 
of the situation.  See, e.g., In re 28th Legislative Dist. Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. 10-14804, 2011 
Bankr. LEXIS 4411 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011) (holding debtor non-profit community 
development organization held properties purchased with grant funding in trust for grant 
providers under federal law, beneficial interests of trust beneficiaries not subject to avoidance 
under § 544(a)(3)); In re W. Cent. Hous. Dev. Org., 338 B.R. 482, 486 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005) 
(same); Gaffney v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (In re Premier Airways, Inc.), 303 B.R. 295 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).  
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interest in it.102 
Meanwhile, during the interval between the bankruptcy and district 
court opinions in the Spokane case, the Portland bankruptcy court considered 
the creditors’ committee’s request for a ruling that the parishes were legally 
indistinct from the debtor, and therefore could not be beneficiaries of an 
implied trust.103  The bankruptcy court held that under Oregon law, 
unincorporated parishes had no capacity to sue, be sued, or hold title to real 
property.104  However, it held that parishioners and other donors who 
contributed to the acquisition and maintenance of parish real property might 
have a beneficial interest in it.105 
C. Religious Corporations with Separately Incorporated Parishes 
1. Transfer Avoidance 
Advocates for sexual abuse creditors in the cases of debtors organized 
as religious corporations with separately incorporated parishes sought to use 
tools available under bankruptcy law to capture property titled in separately 
incorporated parishes as part of property of the diocesan debtor’s estate.  The 
Bankruptcy Code includes statutory provisions known collectively as the 
“trustee’s avoiding powers” under which the bankruptcy trustee, as agent for 
the estate, may avoid certain property interests of third parties, or reverse 
certain pre-petition transfers of property by the debtor to third parties.106  By 
exercising an avoiding power, the trustee can capture a property interest from 
its holder and thereby augment the estate.107  In the cases where the debtor 
was incorporated separately from parishes that held title to their own 
property, transfer avoidance litigation focused on the trustee’s power to 
avoid fraudulent transfers under § 544(b)(1) and § 548.108 
 
 102  In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 at 95. 
 103  Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 868 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).  The debtor 
argued only that the parishes were separate entities from the debtor and apparently conceded 
that schools were not separate entities.  Id. at 865. 
 104  Id. at 866 (citing F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216, 221 
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding the archbishop not liable for tortious interference in a business 
relationship between the parish and a third party because the parish was not legally distinct 
from the archbishop)).   
 105  Id. at 862–63. 
 106  See TABB, supra note 65, at 465. 
 107  See id. at 474 (noting that one of the purposes of the avoiding powers is to maximize 
the value of the estate available for distribution to all creditors).  See generally Thomas H. 
Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984) (asserting that the 
avoiding powers fall into two categories, one that adjusts the rights of creditors relative to 
each other, and the other that adjusts the rights of creditors relative to the debtor). 
 108  Section 548 provides a uniform federal fraudulent transfer avoiding power.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 548 (2018).  Section 544(b) gives the trustee the right to avoid a transfer that a 
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The onslaught of fraudulent transfer challenges in their bankruptcy 
cases could not have been a surprise to the debtors.  Intense national media 
attention to the clergy sexual abuse scandal following the Boston 
Archdiocese story in 2002 provided Catholic bishops with powerful 
incentive to consider the organizational structure and property holdings of 
entities within their dioceses and to take action to protect parish assets from 
diocesan creditors.109  The media noted dioceses’ asset-protective transfer 
activity.110  In the media and in court, the debtors characterized the pre-
petition transfers as benign acts to conform the parishes’ formal title to 
property with their “ownership” right in such property under canon law.111  
In contrast, sexual abuse claimants’ lawyers and the media characterized 
such transfers as malevolent actions to defraud sexual abuse claimants.112 
 
creditor of the estate could avoid under state fraudulent transfer law.  See id. § 544(b) 
 109  See Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit Religious Organizations, 40 
CATH. LAW. 1, 1 (2000) (recommending that corporation sole dioceses separately incorporate 
parishes, dioceses, and fund-raising entities that support them to protect such entities from 
diocesan liability). 
 110  See, e.g., Frank Gibney, Jr., Can a Church Go Broke?, TIME (May 26, 2002), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,250016,00.html (“[S]everal dioceses 
have persuaded plaintiffs to accept reduced settlements, on the grounds that they could not 
afford to pay more” while “leaders divide church property among dozens if not hundreds of 
separate corporations, charities and other institutions.”); Laurie Goodstein, Dolan Sought to 
Protect Church Assets, Files Show, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/us/dolan-sought-vatican-permission-to-shield-assets.h 
tml; Jean Guccione, Diocese Accused of Moving Assets to Avoid Paying Sex-Abuse Claims, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2004), articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/18/local/me-priests18 (reporting 
that several California dioceses transferred title to property held by the bishop to parishes to 
shield it from sexual abuse creditors); Jean Hopfensperger  & Jennifer Bjorhus, Minn. 
Archdiocese Transfer of Assets May Protect It from Bankruptcy Creditors, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 
2, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/archdiocese-shifted-assets-before-filing-bankruptcy/29 
0400991/. 
 111  See, e.g., Objection and Response to Motion for Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors for Authority to Commence, Prosecute and Settle Litigation on Behalf of Bankr. 
Estate Against the Holy See and Diocese-Related Entities at 5–6, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In 
re Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska), 509 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Northern 
Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response] (explaining the transfer of $3 million contributed 
to and held by the diocese in trust for parishes to the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska as 
formalizing a pre-existing trust), aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 
269 (9th Cir. 2016); Archdiocese Clarifies 7th Circuit Court Ruling on Cemetery Trust in 
Chapter 11, ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.archmil.org/News-
2.0/Archdiocese-Clarifies-7th-Circuit-Court-Ruling-on-Cemetery-Trust-in-Chapter-11.htm 
[hereinafter Archiodece Clarifies 7th Circuit Court Ruling]. 
 112  See, e.g., Milo Gyelin, As Sex-Abuse Suits Mount, Church Tries to Protect Real-Estate 
Assets, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1021421244584746560 
(quoting counsel for tort plaintiffs accusing dioceses of “going through their assets and 
shoving them back to local parishes”); Hopfensperger & Bjorhus, supra note 110 (quoting 
David Clohessy, the national director of Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests 
(“SNAP”), as characterizing the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis’s pre-petition 
transfers as “self-serving financial maneuvers” and asking whether anyone could “honestly 
claim that Jesus would have spent time and energy shielding assets?”). 
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2. Derivative Standing 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the power to avoid transfers belongs to the 
bankruptcy trustee113 or, in a Chapter 11 case, to the debtor in possession 
exercising the powers of the trustee.114  Neither individual creditors nor a 
committee of creditors can assert the trustee’s avoiding powers without a 
grant of derivative standing from the bankruptcy court.115  Bankruptcy courts 
grant derivative standing if the particular avoidance action the committee 
wants to pursue is “colorable” and if the debtor in possession is “unjustified” 
in failing to pursue it based on a cost-benefit analysis.116 
The cost-benefit test for derivative standing was an issue in the Diocese 
of Northern Alaska case.  Like the dioceses of Spokane and Portland, the 
Diocese of Northern Alaska had held title to all property, including the real 
property used by parishes and other diocesan affiliates.117  In 2007, the year 
before the diocese filed for relief, it amended its articles of incorporation to 
 
 113  See § 544(a) (“The trustee shall have . . . the rights and powers of, or may avoid any 
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor . . . .”); id. § 
547(b)(“Except as provided . . . the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor 
in property . . . .”); id. § 548(a)(1) (“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . .”). 
 114  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2018)(“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights . . . 
and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case 
under this chapter.”).  The debtor in possession is the fiduciary and legal representative for 
the estate in a Chapter 11 case, with the power to sue and be sued.  See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) 
(2018).  The debtor in possession, as the “trustee,” also has primary standing to bring 
avoidance actions.  See TABB, supra note 65, at 1055.  
 115  See, e.g., Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court, 443 F.3d 1172, 
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a creditor cannot assert a Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim on behalf of the estate without authorization from 
the court or the Chapter 7 trustee); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics 
Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
Congress approved of derivative standing for committees to exercise the trustee’s avoiding 
powers and that bankruptcy courts could grant derivative standing as an exercise of general 
equitable powers where the debtor in possession unreasonably refused to pursue an avoidance 
claim); Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding creditor may obtain 
bankruptcy court permission to bring an adversary action if the trustee unjustifiably refuses 
to do so). 
 116  See, e.g., PW Enters., Inc. v. N.D. Racing Comm’n (In re Racing Servs., Inc.), 540 
F.3d 892, 901 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that determination of whether the trustee unjustifiably 
refuses to bring an avoidance action requires the court to perform a cost benefit analysis); 
Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 
904 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a committee must show that the action it seeks to take 
on behalf of the debtor in possession is a colorable claim and that the debtor in possession 
unjustifiably failed to pursue it, with unjustifiability turning on a cost-benefit analysis as to 
whether pursuit of the action is likely to benefit the estate); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. 
Farmers Savs. Bank (In re Toledo Equip. Co.), 35 B.R. 315, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) 
(finding that a committee must show that the debtor in possession’s refusal to bring an action 
is “unjustifiable or abusive of their discretion”).  
 117  See infra Appendix A: Case Information. 
REILLY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2019  5:02 PM 
2019] CATHOLIC DIOCESES IN BANKRUPTCY 893 
clarify that it held title to parish property in an express trust for parishes.118  
In the bankruptcy case, the creditors’ committee moved for derivative 
standing to avoid the express trusts as fraudulent transfers.119  The court 
denied the motion.120  The Diocese of Northern Alaska covered 410,000 
square miles with forty-six parishes and seventeen priests, but only eight 
parishes raised enough from contributions of parishioners to cover their 
expenses.121  Given the insolvency of parishes and the low likelihood of 
recovery even if the avoidance action was successful, the cost of litigation to 
avoid transfers from the diocese to the parishes was simply not worth the 
candle.122 
In the Archdiocese of Milwaukee case, the creditors’ committee tried 
and failed to obtain derivative standing to recover $35 million in pre-petition 
transfers the Archdiocese had made to parishes out of a diocesan investment 
fund (“the Fund”).  The Archdiocese held title to the Fund into which 
parishes made deposits—a pooled-investment account.  About seven years 
before it filed for bankruptcy, the Archdiocese dissolved the Fund and 
transferred to parishes the amounts each had deposited into it.123  The 
committee alleged that the transfers were avoidable fraudulent transfers 
under § 544(b)(1) and Wisconsin fraudulent transfer law.124 
The bankruptcy court denied the committee’s motion for derivative 
standing to challenge the transfers out of the Fund because the proposed 
 
 118  See Northern Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response, supra note 111, at 4–5.  At the 
same time, each parish recorded a “notice of beneficial interest” in real property in the local 
property records reflecting the parish’s beneficial interest in parish real property titled in the 
name of the bishop.  Id. 
 119  See Motion for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Authority to 
Commence, Prosecute and Settle Litigation on Behalf of Bankruptcy Estate Against the Holy 
See and Diocese-Related Entities at 5–8, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In re Catholic Bishop of N. 
Alaska), 509 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Northern Alaska Creditors’ 
Committee Motion] aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 269 (9th Cir. 
2016).  
 120  See Memorandum Regarding Committee’s Motion to Pursue Litigation and Debtor’s 
Motion to Strike at 13–14, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In re Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska), 509 
B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum Regarding Committee’s 
Motion] aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 269 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 121  See Northern Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response, supra note 111, at 8.  Most of 
the parish property at issue was inaccessible by road and about one-third of the target parishes 
lacked running water.  Id. at 15. 
 122  See id. at 16.  The court did grant the committee derivative standing to pursue an 
avoidance action regarding a $3 million transfer between a pooled investment fund the diocese 
had operated for the benefit of parishes and a trust the diocese created to administer the fund 
within a year before it filed for relief.  See id.  
 122  The court found that the cost-benefit analysis for pursuit of this cash transfer was 
relatively straightforward, and that the debtor was unjustified in its refusal to pursue a 
fraudulent transfer avoidance action against the trust.  See id. at 16–17. 
 123  See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 855, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012). 
 124  See id. at 858. 
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action was not colorable.  First, it was time-barred under the Wisconsin 
statute of limitations.125  Second, the parishes were good faith transferees 
expressly protected from fraudulent transfer avoidance under Wisconsin 
law.126  Moreover, assuming the avoidance action was colorable, the debtor’s 
failure to sue parish transferees was not unjustified.  The committee had 
conceded that litigation against parishes would cost the estate more than $1 
million in legal fees.127  The court considered the overall impact of fraudulent 
transfer litigation against parish transferees.  To pay their fraudulent transfer 
debts, parishes would turn to parishioners, students, and benefactors to 
provide funds, which would “have an adverse effect” on their willingness to 
support the debtor which was critical to the debtor’s ability to continue to 
operate and fund a Chapter 11 plan.128  Moreover, if the committee prevailed, 
the parishes would file claims for reimbursement against the debtor, adding 
to the pool of creditors and diluting the effect of recovery from parishes for 
sexual abuse claimants.129 
After this defeat, sexual abuse claimants in the Milwaukee case raised 
a second fraudulent transfer challenge to a pre-petition transfer.  This 
 
 125  See id. at 866; see also WIS. STAT. § 893.425(1) (2017) (“An action with respect to a 
fraudulent transfer . . . shall be barred unless the action is commenced . . . within 4 years after 
the transfer is made . . . or, if later, within one year after the transfer . . . is or could reasonably 
have been discovered by the claimant.”). 
 126  See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 866 (“In short, the status of the 
Archbishop as president and board member of the Parish corporations does not, without more, 
render the Parishes bad faith transferees . . . .”); see also WIS. STAT. § 242.08(1) (2017) 
(providing a defense for a “person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent 
value”). 
 127  In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 869–70.  About a year earlier, a pooled 
investment account, was a hot button issue in the Diocese of Wilmington case.  Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc. (In re Catholic 
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc.), 432 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).  The debtor disclosed in 
its schedules that it held title to a $120 million pooled investment account (“the PIA”), $45 
million of which was property of the estate, and the balance was subject to a trust in favor of 
thirty-one parish depositors, albeit without an express trust agreement.  Id. at 143.  The 
committee challenged the validity of the trust under Delaware law.  The bankruptcy court held 
that under Delaware law, the investment account was subject to a resulting trust in favor of 
the parish depositors.  Id. at 148 (noting that the relationship between the parish depositors 
and the debtor was analogous to that between investor and broker); see also E. Lake Methodist 
Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Trs. of the Peninsula-Del. Annual Conference, 731 A.2d 798, 809 
(Del. 1999) (holding that, even without an express trust agreement, the diocese held 
investment funds delivered to it by parishes in a “resulting trust” so that the funds were not 
property of the estate).  Under bankruptcy law, however, because the Wilmington parishes’ 
deposits were commingled with property of the estate and untraceable, the entire $120 million 
PIA was property of the estate free and clear.  See In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, 432 
B.R. at 149–50, 158–61.  In contrast, in the Milwaukee case, the Fund was a parish-only 
investment account segregated from any diocesan funds, so that the parishes could easily trace 
their property interests in it.  See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 863–64. 
 128  In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 870. 
 129  See id. at 871.  
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challenge, known as the “Cemetery Trust” litigation, became the subject of 
fierce and protracted litigation through appeal to the Seventh Circuit.130  The 
committee sought to avoid as fraudulent a pre-petition transfer by the 
Archdiocese of about $55 million to an express trust known as the Cemetery 
Trust (“the Trust”).  The Archdiocese owned eight Catholic cemeteries and 
seven mausoleums in the Milwaukee area since 1857.  For decades before 
its bankruptcy, it held an investment account known as the Cemetery Fund 
to maintain its cemeteries.  In 2007, less than a year after settling a group of 
sexual abuse claims for $17 million, the Archdiocese created the Cemetery 
Trust to provide for maintenance of the cemetery property.131  In March 
2008, with approval from the Pope, the Archbishop transferred about $55 
million from the Cemetery Fund into the Cemetery Trust.132  The transfer 
was plainly part of a strategy to shield the funds from archdiocesan creditors.  
In a 2008 letter to the Holy See requesting approval for the transfer, the 
Archbishop wrote that “[b]y transferring these assets to the Trust, I foresee 
an improved protection of these funds from any legal claim and liability.”133 
The transfer to the Cemetery Trust provided sexual abuse creditors a 
much better chance at obtaining derivative standing than their previous 
attempt.  Unlike the multiple transfers from the pooled investment account 
to various parish depositors, the transfer from the Archdiocese to the 
Cemetery Trust presented a single $55 million transfer to a single transferee.  
Moreover, the Archbishop made the transfer with the express intention, as 
he explained to the Pope, to shield cash from the impending claims of sexual 
abuse claimants. 
The committee’s challenge to the $55 million Cemetery Trust transfer 
put the Archbishop in an unusual situation.  In his capacity as trustee of the 
Cemetery Trust, he was the transferee.  In his capacity as archbishop, he was 
the agent for the transferor.  The Archdiocese, as debtor in possession, had 
no incentive to assert its transfer-avoiding powers against the Archbishop to 
avoid the transfer to the Trust.134  To rectify this conflict, with the agreement 
of the parties, the bankruptcy court granted the sexual abuse creditors’ 
 
 130  See Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).   
 131  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 
485 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d and 
remanded, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 132  Id. 
 133  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 734.  The Archdiocese explained that the transfer was not an 
“actual fraud” intended to hinder its creditors, but rather a formalization of the trust for the 
perpetual care of cemeteries under which the Archdiocese had always held the funds that were 
transferred in 2008 into the Cemetery Trust.  See Archdiocese Clarifies 7th Circuit Court 
Ruling, supra note 111. 
 134  See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. at 387. 
REILLY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2019  5:02 PM 
896 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:871 
committee derivative standing.135  The Cemetery Trust litigation proceeded 
with the Archbishop and the committee at odds as to the Archbishop’s 
protection from avoidance on religious liberty grounds as discussed below 
in Part V. 
3. Substantive Consolidation 
In the Saint Paul and Minneapolis case, sexual abuse creditors tried to 
augment the debtor’s estate not by challenging individual transfers from the 
debtor to parishes, but rather by dismantling the legal distinction between the 
debtor and the separately incorporated parishes.  Seventeen months after the 
case commenced, the sexual abuse creditors’ committee moved for 
substantive consolidation of the debtor with about 200 separately 
incorporated entities including 187 parishes, none of which were debtors in 
bankruptcy.136 
The district court held that substantive consolidation of the debtor with 
separately incorporated, non-debtor parishes would be inconsistent with § 
303(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits commencement of an 
involuntary bankruptcy case against a non-profit corporation.137  The Eighth 
Circuit similarly held in favor of the debtor.138  Section 105 only confers 
equitable powers that do not conflict with an explicit mandate of another 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.139  Substantive consolidation would, in 
effect, force parishes into involuntary bankruptcy and would violate § 303(a) 
which expressly protects non-profit organizations (like parishes) from 
 
 135  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 
496 B.R. 905, 916–17 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015); see also In re 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. at 391 (“The Committee, acting derivatively through the 
Debtor as debtor in possession, is defending a lawsuit concerning property of the bankruptcy 
estate.”). 
 136  See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & 
Minneapolis (In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis), 888 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 
2018).  Bankruptcy courts can order substantive consolidation of a debtor with other legally 
distinct entities as an exercise of their general equitable power under § 105.  11 U.S.C. § 
105(a) (2018) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”).  See generally, TABB, supra note 65, at 
242. 
 137  See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & 
Minneapolis, 562 B.R. 755, 762–63 (D. Minn. 2016) (describing substantive consolidation as 
“effectively involuntary bankruptcy” for the non-debtors), aff’d, 888 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2018); 
see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2018).  The circuit court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
finding that, even if the court had authority to order substantive consolidation under § 105, 
the facts did not support it.  See Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 562 B.R. at 763–64 
(applying Eighth Circuit precedent on substantive consolidation as set forth in in First Nat’l 
Bank of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
 138  See In re Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d at 954. 
 139  Id. at 952. 
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involuntary bankruptcy.140 
The Eighth Circuit “le[ft] for another day” the question of whether a 
bankruptcy court could order substantive consolidation of a debtor with a 
non-profit non-debtor if the latter was an alter ego or otherwise not entitled 
to be treated as legally distinct from the debtor under state law.141  The 
committee had asserted that the parishes were legally indistinct from the 
Archdiocese based on the Archbishop’s supervisory role over parishes under 
canon law and the provisions of Minnesota law governing religious 
corporations which expressly recognized the role of the Archbishop in 
organizing and operating parish corporations.142  The court found that the 
committee did not allege facts that could support disregard of the separate 
incorporation of the parishes under Minnesota law.  Even if an alter ego 
theory under state law was viable for substantive consolidation of non-profit 
non-debtors, the committee had not alleged facts sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss.143 
IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
A. The First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Debtors defended against sexual abuse claimants’ efforts to expand 
property of the estate by asserting protection from the application of certain 
aspects of bankruptcy law under the First Amendment and RFRA.  Like the 
litigation over property of the estate, the legal contexts in which religious 
liberty issues arose depended on organizational structure, title to property, 
and property transfers unique to each debtor. 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith,144 the Court applied the First Amendment to protect against 
imposition of a substantial burden on religious expression unless the 
government could show that the burden was necessary to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.145  In Smith, the Court held the Free Exercise Clause 
does not protect against enforcement of “neutral, generally applicable 
law[s]” that impose a substantial burden on religious expression even when 
those laws are not “justified by a compelling governmental interest.”146 
 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. at 953. 
 142  Id. at 948–49. 
 143  Id. at 953. 
 144  494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(2018)), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
 145  See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 146  494 U.S. at 890; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694 
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In 1990, Congress enacted RFRA to supersede the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith.147  Under RFRA, “[g]overnment shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability.”148  The general prohibition on substantial burden 
on the exercise of religion under RFRA is subject to an exception that 
permits “[g]overnment” to substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion if it demonstrates that “application of the burden to the person (1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”149  
Under either First Amendment doctrine or RFRA, a party seeking protection 
from government enforcement of a neutral, generally applicable law must 
show that enforcement of that law imposes a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion.150 
B. The Bankruptcy Code as Neutral, Generally Applicable Law 
In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, Archbishop 
Jerome Listecki sought declaratory judgment on his religious liberty defense 
under RFRA to the committee’s action by derivative standing to avoid the 
$55 million Cemetery Trust Transfer as a fraudulent transfer.151  The 
Archbishop conceded that the Bankruptcy Code was a law of general 
application, but he contended that it was not “neutral” to religion because it 
 
(2014) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)). 
 147  See § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) (noting that the Supreme Court in Smith “virtually 
eliminated” the compelling interest test, and that one of the purposes of RFRA was to restore 
the compelling interest test as set forth in Verner and Yoder); see also Gonzales v. Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (recounting the history of 
RFRA as Congressional action to supersede Smith).  RFRA does not apply to the states.  See 
§ 2000bb-2 (providing that RFRA applies only to the United States, its territories and 
possessions, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico); see also Flores, 521 U.S. at 534 
(holding an earlier version of RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states).  Thirty-three 
states have either enacted similar state legislation or interpreted their state constitutions to 
require a heightened level of judicial scrutiny for state government action that imposes a 
burden on free expression of religion.  See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the 
Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 844–45 nn.22 & 26 (2014) (citing to state legislation 
and court decisions). 
 148  § 2000bb-1(a). 
 149  Id. § 2000bb-1(b).  Subsection 1(c) provides for relief “against a government.”  Id. § 
2000bb-1(c). 
 150  See id. § 2000bb-1(a); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 531–32 (1993) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect against application 
of a neutral, generally applicable law that has only an incidental effect on exercise of religious 
beliefs); Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 860 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) 
(providing that RFRA puts the burden on the person who invokes it to show the neutral law 
imposes a substantial burden). 
 151  See Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
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contains three subsections which recognize exceptions from a general 
transfer avoidance rule for certain transfers to charitable or religious 
transferees.152  Particularly, the Archbishop argued that these subsections are 
“religious” under Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah153 
because they “refer[] to a religious practice [i.e., charitable or religious 
contributions] without a secular meaning discernible from the language or 
context.”154  The Seventh Circuit rejected the Archbishop’s contention 
because the exceptions from avoidance for certain charitable contributions 
do not prohibit the practice of religion, but rather encourage it and thus do 
not implicate the First Amendment.155  Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions that establish property of the estate apply without regard to 
religion or religious beliefs.156 
C. Substantial Burden on Free Exercise of Religion 
As to whether application of bankruptcy law governing property of the 
estate substantially burdens Catholic debtors’ free exercise of religion, a 
recurring consideration was the choice of the debtor to seek relief in 
bankruptcy.  In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court noted that the 
debtor’s choice to organize as a corporation sole and to hold record title to 
property, including property attributed to parishes under canon law, was the 
cause of its problems, not application of the Bankruptcy Code.  The court 
noted that, “[i]f a religious organization’s manner of holding property fails 
under neutral civil law to protect its internal view of property ownership, but 
such internal view could have been accommodated by civil law, the burden 
on the exercise of religion is caused not by the neutral law but by the religious 
organization’s own choice.”157 
Similarly, in the Spokane case, the bankruptcy court reasoned that, 
because the debtors chose the benefits of bankruptcy, they could not 
legitimately complain that the statutory constraints that come with it imposed 
 
 152  Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2018) (providing an exception from fraudulent 
transfer avoidance for certain charitable contributions); id. § 548(d)(4) (defining qualified 
charitable contributions); id. § 544(b)(2) (providing an analogous protection for certain 
charitable contributions from avoidance under state fraudulent transfer law). 
 153  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 154  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 743 (alteration in original omitted); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 
533–34. 
 155  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 744. 
 156  See id.  The Seventh Circuit identified the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that 
together establish “property of the estate” including § 541 (defining “property of the estate”) 
and the avoiding powers by which the trustee augments the estate.  Id. at 743. 
 157  In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 862.  “It is not for 
the civil courts to enforce canon law if the actions of the religious organization under 
applicable civil law do not effectuate what canon law requires.”  Id. 
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a substantial burden on their free exercise right.158  “It is not a burden on a 
religious organization which voluntarily seeks the protection of the 
bankruptcy laws to require it to treat its creditors in the same manner as any 
other debtor.”159  If the debtor found the application of bankruptcy law to be 
a burden on its religious liberty, “the appropriate remedy would be dismissal 
of the bankruptcy case.”160 
In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court delivered a small victory to 
the debtor.  The court considered whether exercise of the trustee’s power 
under § 544(a)(3) to avoid parishes’ unrecorded beneficial interests in all 
real property could substantially burden the debtor’s free exercise of 
religious belief.161  It held that parishioners’ complete loss of access to places 
for Catholic worship and education could be a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion for purposes of the application of RFRA.162  This 
possibility raised an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of 
the committee.163 
Because the bankruptcy court in the Portland case held that avoidance 
under § 544(a)(3) of all unrecorded parish interests in real property could 
substantially burden exercise of religion, it reached the question of whether 
the government’s interest in the enforcement of the trustee’s power under § 
544(a)(3) was compelling.  It grappled with the purpose of § 544(a)(3): “It 
gives to the bankruptcy trustee . . . the ability to avoid certain interests in real 
property that would not be avoidable under state law if there were no actual 
bona fide purchaser of real property.”164  A few paragraphs later, the court 
described the purpose of the avoiding powers generally to “maximize the 
bankruptcy estate and . . . the recovery for creditors.”165  The court observed 
that the Bankruptcy Code provides for exceptions that do not further this 
 
 158  Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 324 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of 
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. 
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).  The bankruptcy court noted 
that “[b]ankruptcy debtors who voluntarily choose to participate in that statutory scheme, even 
those of a religious nature, should not be able to ‘pick and choose’ among Code sections.”  Id. 
 159  Id. at 325. 
 160  Id. at 324 n.5. 
 161  In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 863–64.  The debtor 
argued that wholesale avoidance of parishes’ beneficial interests would result in the loss to 
parishioners of access to places for religious worship and education.  Id. at 859. 
 162   Id. at 863.  “The possibility that the result of the [sexual abuse claimants’] § 544(a)(3) 
claim could be the loss of all parish church and Archdiocesan school properties titled in the 
debtor’s name raises a question of fact regarding whether application of § 544(a)(3) would 
impose a substantial burden on the parishioners’ exercise of religion.” Id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. at 864. 
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policy and concluded that the government’s interest in enforcement of § 
544(a)(3) in this circumstance would not be compelling.166 
D. The Cemetery Trust Litigation 
In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, the Archbishop 
argued that the committee’s exercise (by derivative standing) of the trustee’s 
fraudulent transfer avoiding power would impose a substantial burden on the 
free exercise of religion, against which RFRA protected him, absent a 
compelling governmental interest.167  The Archbishop argued that exercise 
of fraudulent transfer avoiding powers to recapture the corpus of the 
Cemetery Trust for the estate would interfere with his canonical obligation 
to maintain cemetery property as consecrated Catholic burial grounds.168  It 
would also divert funds intended by the faithful for cemetery maintenance to 
payment of sexual abuse claims, inconsistently with canon law which 
requires donations to be applied as the donors intend.169  Both effects would 
substantially burden the Archbishop’s exercise of religion as protected under 
the First Amendment and RFRA.170 
1. Avoidance Actions as Action by the “Government” under 
RFRA 
The committee responded to the Archbishop’s RFRA defense by 
raising a statutory interpretation issue under RFRA that the parties in the 
Spokane and Portland cases had not raised.  It asserted that RFRA applies 
only to actions by the “government,” the committee was not the 
“government,” and therefore, RFRA did not apply to protect the Archbishop 
at all.171 
RFRA defines “government” to include a “branch, department, agency, 
instrumentality and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the 
United States.”172  The committee contended that the committee, in its 
capacity as an official committee in a bankruptcy case, exercising the 
trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power via derivative standing, was not 
 
 166  Id. 
 167  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 168  Id.; see also Corrected Response Brief of Appellee at 6–8, Listecki v. Official Comm. 
of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-2881) [hereinafter Appellee’s 
Corrected Brief]. 
 169  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 
496 B.R. 905, 911 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015); see also 1983 CODE 
C.1267, § 3 (providing that offerings given by the faithful for a particular purpose may be 
applied only for that purpose). 
 170  See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 735. 
 171  Id. at 736. 
 172  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2018). 
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“acting under color of law” so as to constitute the “government” for purposes 
of triggering RFRA protection.173 
Nearly two decades earlier, when the Eighth Circuit in In re Young174 
considered whether RFRA protected a church from a Chapter 7 trustee’s 
fraudulent transfer action, the parties did not dispute whether the Chapter 7 
trustee was the “government” for purposes of RFRA protection, and the court 
did not address it.  The Eighth Circuit noted only that “[t]he bankruptcy code 
is federal law, the federal courts are a branch of the United States, and our 
decision in the present case would involve the implementation of federal 
bankruptcy law.”175 
The Seventh Circuit in Listecki concluded that RFRA applied only to 
“government” action.176  It recognized a distinction on this point between 
RFRA protection and protection under the First Amendment, which provides 
protection against a lawsuit initiated by a private party.177  As to whether the 
committee was the “government,” the Seventh Circuit noted that the phrase 
“under color of law” in the definition of “government” in RFRA should be 
interpreted consistently with the term “under color of [law]” in § 1983.178  A 
private person who acts “under color of law” is a governmental actor.179  
Whether a person acts “under color of law” depends on the presence of a 
“close nexus between the State and the challenged action” such that the 
action “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”180 
The Archbishop argued that the committee was the “government” for 
RFRA purposes because as an official committee appointed by the United 
States Trustee, it was a “government-created, government-supervised, 
 
 173  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 736. 
 174  Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th 
Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
 175  Id. at 1417.   
 176  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737; see also § 2000bb-1(a) (“Government shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided . . . .”); id. § 2000bb-2(1) (“[T]he term ‘government’ 
includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting 
under color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity.”). 
 177  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 741. 
 178  Id. at 738; see also 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia . . . .”); Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that Congress 
intended for courts to apply the meaning of “under color of law” from § 1983 when construing 
the term “government” as used in RFRA), amended and superseded by 894 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
 179  See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737. 
 180  Id. at 738 (citation omitted).  In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court held that 
conduct is under color of law for purposes of § 1983 when the conduct is “the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the [s]tate . . . or by a person for whom the [s]tate is 
responsible,” and when the actor “may fairly be said to be a state actor.”  457 U.S. 922, 937 
(1982). 
REILLY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2019  5:02 PM 
2019] CATHOLIC DIOCESES IN BANKRUPTCY 903 
government-empowered, statutorily protected entity.”181  Moreover, the 
committee acted “under color of law” by exercising, via derivative standing, 
the trustee’s statutory avoiding powers, which are “exclusively held by a 
public actor.”182  The creditors’ committee argued that it was representing 
the private, non-governmental interests of sexual abuse claimants and 
therefore was not the “government.” 183 
The Seventh Circuit rejected both of the Archbishop’s arguments and 
held in favor of the committee.184  It held that an official creditors’ committee 
is not a government actor even though the U.S. Trustee’s office appoints it 
and monitors its activities as part of the Trustee’s responsibility to supervise 
a bankruptcy case.185  Rather, the committee was “a combination of private 
decisions, United States Trustee appointment, and court supervision, with 
private actions providing the qualifying criteria for appointment.”186  The 
court drew an analogy between the role of a committee in a bankruptcy case 
and a public defender in a criminal case.187  “Although some of [the 
committee’s] activities are subject to governmental and court supervision, its 
core function is to act on behalf of, and advance the undivided interest of, its 
clients, namely the private creditors.”188 
The analogy the court drew is inapt.  Although a bankruptcy trustee in 
a Chapter 7 case is typically an individual, he or she does not represent any 
private interests, or hold a private interest in the case apart from 
compensation for services rendered as trustee.189 The Bankruptcy Code 
provides that the “estate” is a separate and distinct legal entity from the 
debtor or any of its creditors.190  The district court has exclusive jurisdiction 
 
 181  Appellee’s Corrected Brief, supra note 168, at 17; see also Listecki, 780 F.3d at 782.  
 182  Appellee’s Corrected Brief, supra note 168, at 23 (citing Christians v. Crystal 
Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 
U.S. 1114 (1997)).  
 183  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737–38. 
 184  Id. at 738. 
 185  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(E) (2018). 
 186  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 738.  The court noted that once appointed, a committee “takes on 
a life of its own” independent of the government.  Id. at 739.  It can retain counsel and obtain 
compensation from the estate, not the government, although the “[t]rustee can weigh in, and 
the court has input” on the attorney client relationship and fees.  Id. 
 187  Id. at 740–41 (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981)). 
 188  Id. at 741 (citations omitted). 
 189  See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (2018) (noting that “the court may allow reasonable 
compensation . . . for the trustee’s services” not to exceed certain percentages of the “moneys 
disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest”); id. § 701 (providing 
that “the United State’s trustee shall appoint” an interim trustee who is a “disinterested 
person” in a chapter 7 case); id. § 1106(a) (same in a chapter 11 case). 
 190  Id. § 541(a) (providing that commencement of a case “creates an estate . . . comprised 
of all of the following property, wherever located and by whomever held”).   
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over property of the estate.191  Unlike a public defender who represents a 
non-governmental criminal defendant, the bankruptcy trustee acts solely as 
representative for the estate.192  The Bankruptcy Code describes some of the 
trustee’s avoiding powers as coextensive with the rights of certain 
hypothetical private creditors under state law.  For example, the trustee’s 
“strong arm” powers to avoid certain unrecorded liens are expressed as 
coextensive with the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide 
purchaser of real property under non-bankruptcy law.193  That the 
Bankruptcy Code sometimes defines the limits of the trustee’s avoiding 
powers as analogous to those of certain hypothetical private creditors does 
not change the trustee into an individual creditor nor does it not affect the 
trustee’s essential function as a disinterested agent for the estate.194 
The court similarly dismissed the Archbishop’s assertion that the 
committee’s derivative standing to assert the rights of the bankruptcy trustee 
made it the “government”  for RFRA purposes without addressing the merits 
of his argument.  The court concluded that because the Archbishop had 
agreed to derivative standing for the committee to resolve his conflict as both 
agent for the debtor/transferor and trustee of the Cemetery Trust/transferee, 
the committee’s exercise of avoiding powers by derivative standing was the 
result of “private ordering” not exercise of governmental powers.195 
2. Compelling Governmental Interest 
Before the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the district court had reached 
the compelling governmental interest issue because unlike the Seventh 
Circuit, the district court had held that the committee was the government 
 
 191  See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2018) (“The district court in which a case under title 11 is 
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction (1) of all the property, wherever 
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the 
estate . . . .”); see also Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2017) (“The estate, which comes into existence when a petition under 
section 301, 302, or 303 is filed, consists of all property that will be subject to the jurisdiction 
of the bankruptcy court.”). 
 192  See § 323(a). 
 193  See § 544(a)(1) (judicial lien creditor); id. § 544(a)(3) (bona fide purchaser of real 
property). 
 194  In support of its conclusion that the creditors’ committee exercising the trustee’s 
powers by derivative standing was not the “government,” the court cited to State Bank of 
Toulon v. Covey (In re Duckworth), 776 F.3d 453, 458 (7th  Cir. 2014), noting in a 
parenthetical only that an “individual trustee” in that case attempted to avoid a transfer.  
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d at 740.  In In re Duckworth, the 
court held that a chapter 7 trustee asserting the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor under § 
544(a)(1) is not subject to parol evidence regarding a mistaken date in a security agreement.  
It held that § 544(a)(1) makes it clear that the trustee’s position exercising the rights of a 
hypothetical judicial lien creditor is “different” than that of a private creditor.  
 195  Id. at 739.  For a criticism of this conclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 261–
65.   
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for purposes of RFRA.196  Because RFRA applied to the committee’s action, 
the district court considered whether the committee’s exercise of fraudulent 
transfer avoiding powers would substantially burden the Archbishop’s 
exercise of religion.  It concluded that it would and that the government 
lacked a compelling interest that could justify such a burden.197 
Recall that years earlier, the bankruptcy court in the Portland case 
considered the debtor’s argument that RFRA protected it from exercise 
(derivatively by the committee) of the trustee’s power to avoid parishes 
unrecorded interests in real property under § 544(a)(3).  It did not address 
the contention that the committee exercising these powers would not be the 
“government” for RFRA purposes because the parties did not raise it.  The 
court in that case reached the same conclusion as the district court in the 
Cemetery Trust litigation, that the burden on the debtor from avoiding the 
parishes’ property interests would be substantial and the government’s 
interest in enforcement of § 544(a)(3) was not compelling.198 
As explained above, when the Cemetery Trust litigation reached the 
Seventh Circuit, the court held that, because the committee was not the 
“government,” RFRA did not apply.  Nonetheless, it reached the issue of 
whether the government’s interest was compelling as part of its analysis of 
whether the First Amendment protected the Archbishop.  For purposes of 
First Amendment protection, and notwithstanding Smith, Seventh Circuit 
precedent required the court to consider whether a neutral law of general 
application would “substantially burden” free exercise of religion, and if so 
whether a compelling government interest justified that burden.199  The court 
held that, even assuming avoidance of the Cemetery Trust transfer would 
substantially burden the Archbishop’s exercise of religion, bankruptcy law 
furthers a compelling governmental interest.200 
The committee had asserted that the compelling governmental interest 
in enforcement of the fraudulent transfer avoiding power was “protection of 
creditors.”201  The Seventh Circuit adopted this assertion enthusiastically.  
 
 196  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 
496 B.R. 905, 917 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (“[T]he pursuit of claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate 
is a traditional public function.”), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 197  Id. at 921–22.  
 198  Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 325 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of 
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. 
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 154–62.  
 199  See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 745 (citing Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 
975, 996 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 200  Id. at 745–46. 
 201  Id. at 745. 
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“[T]he importance of protecting the interests of creditors is readily 
apparent.”202  As support for its conclusion, the court offered an assortment 
of anecdotes about the political and economic significance of bankruptcy 
law.  It cited cases that noted the history of federal bankruptcy law, none of 
which addressed the federal government’s interest in enforcement of the 
Bankruptcy Code in general or the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding 
powers in particular.203  The court undermined its conclusion with two 
references.  First, it cited United States v. Whiting Pools,204 in which the 
Court noted that bankruptcy reorganization furthers a variety of 
governmental interests apart from protecting creditors, including 
preservation of the going-concern value of the debtor, jobs for its employees, 
and a return on investment for shareholders.205  Second, the Seventh Circuit 
cited to United States v. Lee, in which the Court held that the government’s 
interest in enforcement of social security taxation law is compelling.206  The 
Seventh Circuit noted that the social security system “aids those who have 
reached a certain age or are disabled,” whereas, the Bankruptcy Code “aids 
those who have reached a certain financial condition and who need 
assistance repaying or recovering a debt.”207  The Seventh Circuit’s analogy 
between the Bankruptcy Code and the social security system supports the 
conclusion that the government’s compelling interest in the Bankruptcy 
Code is to offer relief to debtors, not creditors. 
The Seventh Circuit clearly expressed its disagreement with the Eighth 
Circuit’s contrary holding in In re Young.208  Before In re Young, courts were 
divided as to whether the Bankruptcy Code presented a compelling 
 
 202  Id. at 747. 
 203  See id. at 745–46; see also Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 365–69 (2006) 
(discussing the history of U.S. bankruptcy laws and support for inclusion of the Bankruptcy 
Clause in the Constitution to permit the federal government to provide a uniform law for 
insolvency and discharge); id. at 372 (avoidance of preferential transfers has long been a “core 
aspect” of bankruptcy law); Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (the Bankruptcy 
Act prohibited discharge of claims based on fraud); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 
531, 540–41 (1994) (history of fraudulent transfer laws); Beiger v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 
(1990) (avoidance powers further the “central policy” of “[e]quality of distribution among 
creditors”); In re River W. Plaza-Chi., LLC, 664 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A central 
purpose of bankruptcy . . . is to maximize creditor recovery.”) (quoting Corp. Assets, Inc. v. 
Paloian, 368 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2004)).   
 204  462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
 205  See Listecki, 780 F3d. at 746 (citing Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203).  The two 
purposes of § 541 are protecting creditors and permitting the debtor to “carry on and rebuild.”  
Id. at 747 (citing Andrews v. Riggs Nat’l Bank (In re Andrews), 80 F.3d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 
1996)).  
 206  455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982). 
 207  Listecki, 780 F.3d at 746.   
 208  Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that “allowing debtors a fresh start and protecting the interests of creditors 
are not compelling governmental interests under RFRA”), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
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governmental interest that could justify a substantial burden imposed on a 
debtor’s free exercise of religion.209  In In re Young, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trustee for an individual debtor brought a fraudulent transfer action against a 
church transferee for tithes the debtor had made to his church in the year 
before he filed for bankruptcy.210  The church transferee asserted that RFRA 
protected it from avoidance.211  The Eighth Circuit held in favor of the 
church.  RFRA protected the church from application of the trustee’s 
avoiding powers because exercise of the trustee’s power would substantially 
impair exercise of religion, and the trustee had not established that avoidance 
of the tithes furthered a compelling government interest.212  The Eighth 
Circuit stated its view: “[W]e cannot see how the recognition of what is in 
effect a free exercise exception to the avoidance of fraudulent transfers can 
undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system as a whole; its effect will 
necessarily be limited to the debtor’s creditors, who will as a result have 
fewer assets available.”213 
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in In re 
Young as “cursory” and criticized it for failing to consider “the importance 
of the [Bankruptcy] Code in Supreme Court precedent, our nation’s history, 
or the effect it has on debtors and creditors.”214  It adopted the conclusion of 
the dissenting opinion in In re Young that enforcement of the Bankruptcy 
Code as a whole “furthers the compelling governmental interest in . . . 
 
 209  See Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 251–52 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (holding that the government’s interest in avoiding tithes to the 
debtor’s church as fraudulent transfers was compelling); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that protection of legitimate interests of creditors is a 
compelling governmental interest).  But see In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
1995) (holding that the exercise of avoiding powers to expand the estate for creditors is not a 
compelling interest). 
 210  82 F.3d at 1410.  The trustee argued that the tithes were transfers made “for less than 
reasonably equivalent value” while the debtor was insolvent, and were thus avoidable under 
§ 548 as constructively fraudulent.  Id. at 1414.  
 211  Id. at 1417.  
 212  Id. at 1420. 
 213  Id.  In 1998, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code expressly to exclude certain pre-
petition charitable and religious contributions by debtors to religious organization from 
fraudulent transfer avoidance in the donor’s bankruptcy case.  See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) 
(1998) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2018)).  The 1998 amendments also preclude 
a court from considering a debtor’s qualifying charitable contributions for purposes of 
calculating his means to pay creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (1998) (current version at 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2018)).  The amendments treat qualifying charitable contributions as 
“reasonably necessary” expenses for purposes of determining the “disposable income” 
available to pay creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2018). 
 214  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 747 (7th Cir. 2015).  
The court described as “without explanation” the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the 
government’s interest in creditor protection in the Bankruptcy Code is distinguishable from 
the government’s interest in national security or public safety and therefore not compelling.  
Id. 
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protecting the interests of creditors by maximizing the debtor’s estate.”215  
Moreover, it held that the Bankruptcy Code is “narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.”216 
The court’s conclusion rests on an absurdly sweeping generalization 
about the purpose of bankruptcy law.  The Bankruptcy Code does not serve 
a single governmental purpose for which the government’s interest in 
enforcement without exception is always compelling.  Rather, the 
Bankruptcy Code endeavors to achieve a balance among a host of sometimes 
conflicting governmental goals, including but not limited to maximizing 
payout to unsecured creditors.217  For example, the trustee’s power to avoid 
fraudulent transfers, the avoiding power at issue in the Cemetery Trust 
litigation, does not invalidate every wealth-depleting transfer that reduces 
unsecured creditors’ expected payment.  Rather, whether the trustee can 
avoid a transfer as fraudulent depends on a complicated balance between the 
interests of the transferor’s creditors and the interests of the transferee.218 
In November 2015, after the committee’s victory before the Seventh 
Circuit in the Cemetery Trust litigation, the parties reached a settlement and 
confirmed a consensual plan.219  The plan provided for a $21 million fund to 
 
 215  Id. at 746 (alteration in original) (quoting Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free 
Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1422 (8th Cir. 1996) (Bogue, J., dissenting)), vacated, 
521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
 216  Id. at 749.  The court must look “beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the 
general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting 
specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”  Id. at 748 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Gonzales v. Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 
(2006)). 
 217  See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (observing that 
“[b]y permitting reorganization, congress anticipated that the business would continue to 
provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, p. 220 (1977); see also Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2017) (noting that “any approach to corporate 
reorganization must strike a balance between the need of a corporate debtor in financial 
hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and 
stakeholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible”). 
 218  Fraudulent transfer law takes into account the bona fides of the transferee, protecting 
the transferee from avoidance in circumstances when the transferee participated in the transfer 
for value and in good faith.  See § 548(c) (stating that a transferee of an avoidable fraudulent 
transfer who takes for value and in good faith has a lien on the transferred property to the 
extent of value he gave for the property); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 536, 
545 (1994) (stating that a transferee who acquires property at a non-collusive, regularly 
conducted foreclosure sale gives “reasonably equivalent value” and is protected from 
fraudulent transfer avoidance under § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) even though the foreclosure sale price 
is below the fair market value for the property).   
 219  See generally Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dated September 
25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 
11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Second Amended Chapter 11 
Plan].   
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compensate sexual abuse claimants, five times more than the debtor had 
proposed in a plan it filed in February 2014.220  The Cemetery Trust 
committed to loan the debtor $3 million and contribute $8 million to the 
claims settlement fund.221  Insurers provided $11 million.  Total professional 
fees paid by the estate were approximately $27 million.222  The bankruptcy 
court confirmed the consensual plan after concluding that the debtor’s plan 
was in creditors’ best interests compared to liquidation.223  Notwithstanding 
a favorable outcome for sexual abuse claimants on the Archbishop’s 
religious liberty protection before the Seventh Circuit, the odds that the 
sexual abuse creditors’ committee could avoid the $55 million Cemetery 
Trust transfer under § 544(b) and Wisconsin law were far from certain. 
3. Competing Plans and Cram Down 
The Saint Paul and Minneapolis case was the first to involve a 
competing creditors’ plan and cram down confirmation under § 1129(b).  All 
previous cases, except San Diego (which was dismissed after settlement), 
have concluded with confirmation of a consensual plan.224  While the 
substantive consolidation litigation was pending in the Saint Paul and 
Minneapolis case, the Archdiocese filed its first plan of reorganization in 
May 2016.225  The parties failed to reach a settlement, and after the expiration 
of the period in which the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan in 
August 2016, the committee of sexual abuse claimants filed a competing 
plan.226 
 
 220  Id. at 25–26; see also Annysa Johnson, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Settles Sexual Abuse 
Claims for $21 Million, J. SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/religio 
n/archdiocese-settles-sexual-abuse-claims-for-21-million-b99542352z1-320651132.html/.  
 221  See Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 219, at 23; see also Rich Kirchen, 
Judge OK’s Final Archdiocese of Milwaukee Chapter 11 Plan with $21M to Abuse Victims, 
MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2015/11/0 
9/judge-oks-final-archdiocese-of-milwaukeechapter-11.html. 
 222  See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement for the Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan 
of Reorganization Dated September 25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee at 
44, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement]. 
 223  Order Confirming Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dated 
September 25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee at 8, In re Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 13, 2015).  The Disclosure Statement 
explained that the Plan satisfied the best interest test as to sexual abuse claimants because in 
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, unsecured creditors would receive no distribution unless 
the trustee achieved a significant recovery from the Cemetery Trust in fraudulent transfer 
avoidance litigation.  See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 222, at 89–96. 
 224  See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases. 
 225  See Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & 
Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
May 26, 2016). 
 226  See Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Official Committee of Unsecured 
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The debtor had settled with eleven of thirteen of its insurers, subject to 
court approval of its plan.227  The debtor’s plan provided for a $500,000 
counseling fund for sexual abuse claimants and creation of an independent 
trust to administer and pay sexual abuse claims.228  The trust included about 
$100 million to be contributed by archdiocesan insurers and $30 million by 
parishes, parish insurers, and the Archdiocese.229  It provided for discharge 
of all tort claims against the Archdiocese and a channeling injunction that 
channeled any pre-petition claims against the Archdiocese, the parishes, and 
settling insurers, exclusively against the trust.230 
The committee’s competing plan similarly created a trust for payment 
of sexual abuse claims, but the Archdiocese was required to contribute at 
least $99 million.231  The committee would control the trust which would 
succeed to the debtor in possession’s transfer avoidance actions against 
parishes and its rights against its insurers, nullifying debtor’s conditional 
settlements and queueing up years of litigation.232  It did not provide for 
immediate discharge of the debtor or the parishes or for a channeling 
injunction.233  Ninety-four percent of the members of the class of sexual 
abuse claimants voted to reject the debtor’s plan.234 
 
 
Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & 
Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016); see also Joint Chapter 11 Plan 
of Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint 
Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 28, 2018) [hereinafter Joint 
Chapter 11 Plan].  The debtor in a Chapter 11 case has the exclusive right to file a plan of 
reorganization during the first 120 days after commencement of the case.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
1121(b) (2018).  If the debtor files a plan during this exclusive period, the debtor has until 
180 days after commencement of the case to obtain creditor consent.  Id. § 1121(c)(3).   
 227  First Amended Disclosure Statement for First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 12, In re Archdiocese of 
Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016).  Under the plan, 
the debtor contributed all of its rights against two of the insurers to the trust and nine in cash.  
Id.  The Committee conceded that six of the eleven settlements were reasonable and objected 
to the remaining five.  Id. at 13.  
 228  Id. at 57.   
 229  Id. at 2–3, 11. 
 230  Id. at 100–101; see also First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the 
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 16–17, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & 
Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter First Amended 
Chapter 11 Plan].   
 231  Disclosure Statement for Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Official Committee 
of Unsecured Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 2, 56–57, C-2, In 
re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). 
 232  Id. at 23. 
 233  Id. at 33, 35.   
 234  See Legal Objection to Confirmation of the Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11 
Plan of Reorganization at 6, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 
(Bankr. D. Minn. July 1, 2017). 
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The committee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s plan on grounds 
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to impose a channeling 
injunction protecting parishes (non-debtors) over the objection of the class 
of sexual abuse creditors whose claims would be affected.235  The debtor 
argued in favor of confirmation of its plan, asserting that without a 
channeling injunction including claims against parishes and insurers, no 
reorganization would be possible.236 
Both sides recognized a split in the circuits on the question of whether 
or under what circumstances a bankruptcy court can impose a channeling 
injunction without the consent of affected creditors.237  The bankruptcy court 
held that it had jurisdiction to order a channeling injunction to protect non-
debtors.238  However, the debtor’s plan could not be confirmed absent 
“significant acceptance” by the creditors whose claims would be subject to 
the channeling injunction.239  Because more than ninety percent of the 
members of the class of sexual abuse claimants voted to reject the debtor’s 
plan, the requisite “significant acceptance” was lacking.240 
The bankruptcy court held that the committee’s plan was “replete with 
uncertainties and contingencies that will frustrate the debtor’s effort to 
 
 235  Id. at 6 (noting that if the court were to confirm the debtor’s plan including the 
channeling injunction protecting non-debtors it would be “the first bankruptcy court in the 
country to do anything of the kind”).  The committee also argued that absent consent of the 
parties, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction in effect to enter a final judgment on sexual 
abuse claimants’ state law claims against non-debtors because such matters were not “core 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11.”  Id. at 11–12.  
 236  Omnibus Response to Legal Objections to the Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11 
Plan of Reorganization at 5, 17–18, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-
30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017) (citing In re 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Co., No. 
13-13653, 2014 WL 886433, at *15–16 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2014) (holding that, because 
reorganization would otherwise be impossible, approving injunctions was necessary to protect 
the debtor’s key employees notwithstanding claimants’ rejection of the plan)) (“Put simply, a 
channeling injunction represents the best and only vehicle for a fair and just global resolution 
of claims in this case.”). 
 237  See Order Denying Confirmation of Debtor’s Plan Dated and Filed on December 19, 
2016 at 4–13, In re  Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis,  No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Order Denying Confirmation of Plan] (describing state of 
the law among the circuits).  The parties agreed that the applicable standard for an injunction 
protecting non-debtors was set out by the bankruptcy court in In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund, 
168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).  The court should consider five factors: (1) an identity 
of interest between the debtor and the third party, e.g. indemnity, such that a suit against the 
non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or implicating estate assets; (2) the non-
debtor has contributed “substantial assets” to the reorganization; (3) the injunction is essential 
to reorganization; (4) a “substantial majority” of the impacted class of creditors agrees to such 
injunction; and (5) the plan provides a mechanism for the payment of “all, or substantially 
all,” of the claims of the impacted class.  Id. at 934–35.   
 238  See Order Denying Confirmation of Plan, supra note 237, at 13–14. 
 239  Id. at 16. 
 240  Id.  
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reorganize,” and created a long list of issues for litigation and court 
resolution as part of the confirmation process.241  Perhaps the most daunting 
open issue was a determination of the assets to be included as in property of 
the estate and the value of those assets.  The bankruptcy court dubbed the 
committee’s plan a “plan of future litigation” and a “boon for lawyers” with 
no chance of achieving timely payment to creditors and successful 
reorganization of the debtor.242 
In a joint memorandum denying confirmation of both plans, the 
bankruptcy judge expressed his frustration with both parties who failed to 
agree on a plan after three years.243  Resolution of the case, the judge wrote, 
will require an agreement.  The parties and their lawyers “must put aside 
their desire to win and decide to put together a resolution that is fair to all 
the people involved.”244  In June 2018, the parties reached agreement on a 
consensual plan that would provide $210 million for 450 sexual abuse 
claimants.245 
V. THE LEGACY OF THE CATHOLIC BANKRUPTCY CASES 
A. Organization Under Canon Law 
In some respects, the Catholic bankruptcies are not unusual among 
bankruptcy cases of non-profit organizations.246  The absence of profit-
seeking stockholders or any market analog to evaluate the effectiveness of 
managerial decisions relative to the competition increases risk of loss from 
incompetence or fraud.247  All non-profit organizations are prone to 
mismanagement notwithstanding the sincerity of their religious beliefs or 
 
 241  Order Denying Confirmation of the Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Plan Dated 
and Filed on December 19, 2016 at 23, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 
15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Order Denying Confirmation]. 
 242  Id. at 25. 
 243  Joint Memorandum to Orders Denying Confirmation of Plans Filed by the Debtor and 
the Creditors Committee at 1, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 
(Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Memorandum].  
 244  Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).  The court noted that sexual abuse claimants’ lawyers 
may be a source of plan funding.  Assuming 33% contingency fees, attorneys’ fees for sexual 
abuse claimants’ lawyers would range between $30 and $40 million dollars, a “pretty hefty 
sum for completing proofs of claim.”  Id. at 3–4. 
 245  See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases. 
 246  See Foohey, supra note 11, at 278 (noting that about ninety religious organizations file 
petitions under Chapter 11 each year). 
 247  See Comm. on Budget & Fin., Diocesan Internal Controls: A Framework, U.S. CONF. 
OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/about/financial-reporting/diocesan-internal-
controls-framework.cfm (last visited May 10, 2019) (providing guidelines to alert bishops to 
weaknesses in internal controls, risk of embezzlement, and fraudulent financial reporting).  
The USCCB has recognized this risk.  Id.  
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mission.248 
Catholic organizations are different from other non-profit organizations 
in two respects.  First the Catholic bankruptcies have revealed a heightened 
vulnerability to mismanagement because of the hierarchical structure of 
Catholic organizations under canon law.  Relative to congregational 
religious organizations, canon law assigns unilateral authority in the bishop 
to assign and supervise priests assigned to parishes.  But, the bishop is neither 
accountable to the pastor or parishioners in the parishes where the priests 
serve, nor privy to day to day parish operations.  The separation between 
authority and the consequences of the exercise of authority increases the risk 
of mismanagement, cover up, and resulting tort exposure for Catholic 
organizations relative to that of non-hierarchical non-profit organizations. 
Second, centralized authority in the bishop of title to parish property, 
or centralized supervisory authority in the bishop over separately 
incorporated parishes and indirectly over their decentralized property 
interests, likely increases the expected value of sexual abuse claims against 
Catholic dioceses relative to similar claims against non-hierarchical religious 
organizations.  Professor Douglas Laycock noted the impact of the Catholic 
hierarchical organizational structure on the magnitude of its tort liability.  “A 
scandal like [the clergy sexual abuse scandal] becomes utterly destructive of 
Catholicism in the United States and not of Protestantism in the United States 
without regard to differences in the culpability of the conduct.”249 
The hierarchical structure of Catholic organizations under canon law 
created a paradox in their bankruptcy cases because it departs from the 
ordinary democratic corporate governance structure that underlies efficient 
loss allocation under organizational law and bankruptcy law.  The Catholic 
bankruptcy cases opened to public view the fact that Catholic parishes and 
the individual Catholics who support them financially are not analogous to 
shareholders of the diocese, or even ordinary autonomous donors to a non-
hierarchical religious organization.  Catholics do not control the 
management of their parishes or their diocese, other than as advisors to the 
pastor.250 They can exercise the power of the purse by withholding 
 
 248  See John B. Duncan et al., Internal Control Systems in U.S. Churches: An Examination 
of the Effects of Church Size and Denomination on Systems of Internal Control, 12 ACCT. 
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 142, 142–43 (1999). 
 249  Roundtable Discussion: Religious Organizations Filing for Bankruptcy, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25, 40 (2005) [HEREINAFTER ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION]; SEE ALSO 
Transcript of the Dedication Ceremony for the Conrad B. Duberstein Bankruptcy 
Courthouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2005).  During the roundtable discussion, 
Douglas Laycock asserted that “the choice of religious structure is a constitutionally protected 
choice.”  See Roundtable Discussion, supra at 40. 
 250  See 1983 CODE C.537 (requiring each parish to have a parish finance council regulated 
by “universal law” as well as “by norms issued by the diocesan bishop” which serves to “assist 
the pastor in the administration of the goods of the parish”). 
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contributions. However, use of this tool to discipline ineffective management 
is difficult to square with canon law that requires Catholics to support the 
Church.251  Catholics can protest bad management by leaving the Church and 
there is evidence that Catholics have done so in response to the sex abuse 
scandal.252  But abrogation of faith as a monitoring tool is costly relative to 
a shareholder’s ability to sell shares in a mismanaged firm. 
B. Contribution by Parishes and Parishioners 
 Sexual abuse claimants organized as creditors’ committees were no 
doubt effective in using the tools available to creditors in bankruptcy court 
as leverage in plan negotiations outside of the courtroom.  Their successes 
were all in preliminary skirmishes.  No bankruptcy court has entered an order 
to avoid a parish’s interest in property, to avoid a property transfer to a 
parish, or to disregard the corporate distinction between a parish and a 
diocese to which the entities would otherwise be entitled to under state 
corporation law. 
No doubt all parties in the Catholic bankruptcy cases understood that a 
bankruptcy court order approving a trustee’s sale of a Catholic parish church 
or school would likely set off an explosion of self-immolating litigation.  
Apart from the daunting practical challenge of appraising and marketing 
specialized, religious use property given zoning and other limitations on such 
property for non-religious use, the Bankruptcy Code requires  a non-profit 
debtor to comply with any state law restrictions for sale of property under § 
 
 251  See id. C.222, § 1 (requiring the faithful to “assist with the needs of the Church so that 
the Church has what is necessary for divine worship, for the works of the apostolate and of 
charity, and for the decent support of ministers”); see also Elizabeth Fernandez, Catholic 
Group Strives to Mend Church / Voice of Faithful Wants Active Laity to Address Clergy 
Scandal, S.F. GATE (Feb. 3, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Catholic-group-
strives-to-mend-church-Voice-of-2636824.php (expressing frustration of the role of the laity 
as “pray, pay and obey”). 
 252  See Angela K. Dills & Rey Hernandez-Julian, Negative Publicity and Catholic 
Schools, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 143 (2012) (noting that the negative publicity from the sex abuse 
scandal explains about five percent of the decline in the number of Catholic schools in the last 
twenty years); Daniel M. Hungerman, Substitution and Stigma: Evidence on Religious 
Markets from the Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal, 5 AM. ECON. J. 227 (2013) (noting that the 
scandal led to the departure of two million Catholics, generating an estimated three billion 
dollars in donations to other religious groups). 
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363(b)253 and as a condition to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.254  It 
is not clear how a bankruptcy court could order a liquidation sale of religious 
property if it were subject to state law transfer restrictions. 
Nor is it clear how courts would rule on a religious liberty defense 
raised by a Catholic bishop in opposition to a bankruptcy court-ordered sale 
of a parish church or school.  The bankruptcy cases so far have explored only 
the theoretical surface of RFRA or First Amendment protection from transfer 
avoidance litigation.  Apart from the concern expressed by the bankruptcy 
court in Portland over a substantial burden on free exercise of religion upon 
loss of all facilities for worship and education, the bankruptcy cases have left 
unresolved bankruptcy and religious liberty issues triggered by a court-
ordered liquidation of parish property used for worship or religious 
education. 
The focus of litigation in the Catholic bankruptcy cases on parish 
property as property of a diocesan debtor’s estate should not obscure the 
importance of future contributions of Catholic faithful as a plan-funding 
source.  Canon law obligates Catholics to support the Church.255  It gives the 
bishop authority to tax parishes for ordinary support of the diocese, but 
 
 253  11 U.S.C. § 363(d)(1) (2018) (permitting a trustee to “use, sell, or lease property [out 
of the ordinary course]” only in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law that governs 
the transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is a non-profit organization); see also id. 
§ 541(f) (2018) (property held by a federal tax exempt debtor may be transferred to a non-tax 
exempt debtor only by complying with all “conditions as would apply” if the debtor had not 
filed for bankruptcy).  See generally Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.04 (16th ed. 2017).  New York law, for example, prohibits transfer of 
substantially all the assets of a non-profit organization unless, among other requirements, the 
terms of the transfer are “fair and reasonable to the corporation” and “the purposes of the 
corporation or the interests of the members will be promoted” by the transaction.  N.Y. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(d) (2018); see also In re HHH Choices Health Plan, LLC, 554 
B.R. 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (considering all the circumstances and approving proposed 
sale of substantially all the assets of a non-profit debtor under § 363(d)(1)). 
 254  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2018) (“All transfers of property under the plan shall be 
made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the 
transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial 
corporation or trust.”).   
 255  See 1983 CODE C.222, § 1 (providing that the faithful are “obliged to assist with the 
needs of the Church so that the Church has what is necessary for divine worship, for the works 
of the apostolate and of charity, and for the decent support of ministers”); id. C.1262 (“The 
faithful are to give support to the Church by responding to appeals . . . .”); id. C.1261, § 1 
(providing that the faithful are “free to give temporal goods for the benefit of the Church”).  
Commentators explain these provisions as directed at secular law that limits the freedom of 
the Church to receive donations or of the faithful to donate.  NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON 
LAW, supra note 19, at 1461 (providing that C.1261, § 1 is understood to be “directed at those, 
within or outside the Church, who would seek to deny or discourage such an exercise of 
religious liberty,” and asserting that bishops have a right to financial support of the faithful 
against interference by civil authority); see also C.1260 (“The Church has an innate right to 
require from the Christian faithful those things which are necessary for the purposes proper 
to it.”). 
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imposes no obligation on the bishop to do so.256  Assessment by dioceses of 
parishes is common, however it appears that parishes comply voluntarily 
with such assessments.257  Although Catholic bishops certainly expect 
Catholic faithful to provide financial support for their dioceses through 
parish assessments, this expectation of support is neither the diocese’s 
property under secular law, nor as a basis for funding a feasible, confirmable 
plan.258 
The question of whether a bankruptcy court could compel parishes or 
individual members of the Catholic faithful to fund their diocese’s plan of 
reorganization arose in the Saint Paul and Minneapolis case.  The sexual 
abuse creditor’s committee’s plan provided that the diocese would transfer 
to a trust established to pay sexual abuse claimants the diocese’s rights to 
collect past-due assessments owed to the diocese by the parishes.259  The 
parishes objected to confirmation of the committee’s plan, arguing, among 
other things, that the Archbishop’s power to assess parishes is not a secular 
 
 256  See C.1263.  To impose a tax, the bishop must first consult with the diocesan finance 
council and presbyteral council.  Id.  The bishop also has authority to order parishes to take 
up a special collection “for specific parochial, diocesan, national, or universal projects.” 
C.1266; see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1465 (“A diocesan 
bishop who chooses not to use the coercive instrument of taxation in order to meet the needs 
of the diocese, but who prefers to rely on free-will offerings in response to fund–raising 
appeals, is free to do so.”); Robert L. Kealy, Taxation, Assessments and Extraordinary 
Collections, in CHURCH FINANCE HANDBOOK 77, 79 (Kevin E. McKenna et al. eds., 1999).  
The bishop may impose an extraordinary tax on parishes and on individual parishioners for 
needs out of the ordinary course “in case of grave necessity.”  C.1263; see also Matthew J. 
Barrett, The Theological Case for Progressive Taxation as Applied to Diocesan Taxes or 
Assessments Under Canon Law in the United States 63 JURIST 312, 335 (2003) (noting that a 
few bishops have used this authority to tax parishioners to raise revenue to fund an employee 
pension plan or for housing for retired priests); THE CANON LAW SOC’Y OF GR. BRIT. & IR., 
supra note 44, at 713 (noting that some bishops have imposed extraordinary taxes to pay 
diocesan legal fees in sexual abuse litigation). 
 257  See, e.g., DIOCESE OF PHOENIX, BISHOP’S ASSESSMENT POLICY (2016) (imposing a 
penalty for late payments); DIOCESE OF SAULT SAINTE MARIE, POLICY NO. 2: DIOCESAN 
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSE (2016) (noting that the assessment “is payable at the end of each 
month”); The Process and Use of Parish Assessments, CATH. DIOCESE OF CLEVELAND, 
https://www.dioceseofcleveland.org/offices/finance/report-to-the-community/the-process-
and-use-of-parish-assessments (last visited May 10, 2019)  (noting “[e]ach parish is expected 
to remit their assessment to the Diocese in a timely fashion over the course of the fiscal year”).  
 258  See § 1129(a)(11); see also In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 
04-37154, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1180, at *24 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007) (“Feasibility has 
been defined as whether the things which are to be done after confirmation can be done as a 
practical matter under the facts.” (quoting In re Jorgensen, 66 B.R. 104, 108 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1986)).  A plan funded primarily by future donations raises a concern about its feasibility.  
See, e.g., Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) All., Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, LLC (In re Save Our Spring 
(S.O.S.) All., Inc.), 632 F.3d 168, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a plan funded 
exclusively by donations was not feasible); In re Indian Nat’l Finals Rodeo Inc., 453 B.R. 
387, 402 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011). 
 259  Joint Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 226, at 56; see also First Amended Chapter 11 Plan, 
supra note 230, § 5.2(e)(3). 
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legal right, not property of the estate, and not an appropriate source of 
funding for a feasible plan.260 
The bankruptcy court agreed with the parishes.  It concluded that a 
bishop’s authority to assess parishes is not a legal right and therefore is not 
property of the debtor’s estate under § 541.261  In a memorandum 
accompanying the order dismissing both plans and relegating the parties to 
resume negotiation, however, the court admonished parishes that they “must 
consider the possibility of contributing something” to compensate sexual 
abuse claimants as part of a consensual plan.  “The fact that the abuse may 
not be the legal responsibility of the parishes. . . is hardly the point, any more 
than their work to help the hungry and homeless are motivated by legal 
responsibilities.”262 
C. Religious Liberty for Debtors 
Courts that have considered Catholic debtors’ religious liberty defenses 
to the application of bankruptcy law have overwhelmingly rejected them.  A 
recurring judicial reaction to debtors’ arguments was that having chosen 
bankruptcy, Catholic dioceses and institutes must leave their religious status 
at the courthouse door.  In the Spokane case, the bankruptcy court observed, 
“Bankruptcy debtors who voluntarily choose to participate in that statutory 
scheme, even those of a religious nature, should not be able to ‘pick and 
choose’ among Code sections.”263  In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court 
suggested that a party for whom application of § 541 would impose a 
substantial burden on religious expression does not need to assert the First 
Amendment to protect itself.  It can simply forgo the benefits of a bankruptcy 
proceeding.264  In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, the 
Seventh Circuit noted that the Archdiocese knew of and voluntarily 
undertook the costs associated with filing for bankruptcy, including loss of 
control over property of the estate.265  The court went so far as to assert that 
 
 260  Objection of the Official Committee of Parish Creditors to Confirmation of the 
Chapter 11 Plan of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 1–3, 5, In re Archdiocese 
of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 7, 2017). 
 261  Order Denying Confirmation, supra note 241, at 19. 
 262  Joint Memorandum, supra note 243, at 3. 
 263  Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of 
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 324 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of 
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. 
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006). 
 264  Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 853 n.9 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (stating 
that if the First Amendment protected the debtor from application of the bankruptcy code, the 
proper remedy “might well be dismissal of the case”).   
 265  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 747 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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the Archdiocese’s choice to file for Chapter 11 relief was evidence of the 
government’s “significant interest” in the enforcement of bankruptcy 
laws.266 
We are left with a thin and confusing record that offers little guidance 
on key issues.  The Seventh Circuit in Listecki made it clear that it decided 
only that the Archbishop was not entitled to protection from the committee’s 
fraudulent transfer litigation under either the First Amendment or RFRA. It 
did not decide whether the transfer from the Archdiocese to the Cemetery 
Trust was avoidable, because that issue was not before it.267  As discussed 
above, its narrow conclusion relied on fundamental misunderstandings of 
bankruptcy law.268 
When the question of whether the bankruptcy trustee is a governmental 
actor has arisen in other contexts, courts have treated the trustee as a 
government actor.  For example, courts have consistently held that the 
Barton doctrine protects bankruptcy trustees from suit in district court for 
actions taken in exercise of their authority over property of the estate.269  The 
Barton doctrine generally prohibits suit against a court-appointed receiver in 
a federal district court without permission of the court who appointed him.270  
The Seventh Circuit in In re Linton271 held that the Barton doctrine applies 
to suits against a bankruptcy trustee because the trustee “is a statutory 
successor to the equity receiver . . . working in effect for the court that 
appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under the 
court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.”272  The Seventh Circuit 
in Listecki did not consider its own precedent in In re Linton. 
After the Seventh Circuit decided Listecki, the Third Circuit held, in In 
re J & S Properties,273 without discussing Listecki, that a bankruptcy trustee 
acting as agent for the estate is a governmental actor.274  The court considered 
whether a bankruptcy trustee was entitled to qualified immunity from 
 
 266  Id. 
 267  Id. at 736. 
 268  See discussion supra Part IV.D.1–2. 
 269  See, e.g., Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), 841 F.3d 1090, 
1094 (9th Cir. 2016); Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004); Carter v. Rodgers, 
220 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996); Allard 
v. Weitzman (In re Delorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240–41 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 270  Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 129 (1881) (stating that plaintiffs must obtain the 
permission of the bankruptcy court before suing certain officers acting in their official 
capacities). 
 271  136 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 272  Id. at 545. 
 273  Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S Props., LLC), 872 F.3d 
138 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 274  Id. at 143. 
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liability under § 1983 for actions taken as bankruptcy trustee to preserve 
property of the estate.275  Applying the test for qualified immunity set forth 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,276 the Third Circuit held that the trustee was entitled 
to immunity.277  Noting that a trustee has a duty to protect property of the 
estate, account for it to the court, and perform other adjudicatory and 
administrative functions, the court held that it was “clear that Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy Trustees . . . are government officials.”278 
Because the Seventh Circuit in Listecki determined that exercise of the 
trustee’s avoiding powers was not action of the “government,” it did not 
decide whether, if RFRA applied, the government’s interest in enforcing the 
trustee’s avoiding powers against the Archbishop would be sufficiently 
compelling to justify a substantial burden on free exercise of religion.  Under 
RFRA, courts must consider whether the government’s interest is 
compelling with reference to the application of a specific law to the 
“particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially 
burdened.”279  The Supreme Court has held in cases construing RFRA that 
whether a substantial burden is justified by a compelling governmental 
interest turns on “a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to 
the facts of each particular claim.”280 The compelling interest test under 
RFRA is “not to be made in the abstract” but rather “in the circumstances of 
[the] case.”281 
The Seventh Circuit’s justification for its conclusion that the 
government’s interest in enforcement of bankruptcy law was compelling for 
 
 275  After a dispute with a tenant, the trustee changed the locks on a building which was 
the largest asset in the estate, ostensibly to preserve the asset from damage.  Id. at 140–41.  
The tenant sued the trustee for wrongful eviction and violation of its Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under § 1983.  Id. at 141–42. 
 276  457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 277  In re J & S Props., LLC, 872 F.3d at 143. 
 278  Id.; see also Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that the bankruptcy trustee performs “both adjudicatory and administrative functions” 
and is a congressionally-created “hybrid official”).  
 279  Gonzales v. Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–431 
(2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2018)). 
 280  Id. at 431 (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 
42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2018)), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 
(2015)); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993) (stating that a compelling interest is one “of the highest order” and is found in “rare 
cases”). 
 281  Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000); see also Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725 (2014) (stating that the government must demonstrate 
that its “marginal interest in enforcing the [challenged law] in these cases” is compelling); 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 n.9 (2011) (“[T]he government does not 
have a compelling interest in each marginal percentage point by which its goals are 
advanced.”). 
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First Amendment protection falls short of the individualized analysis the 
Court has required under RFRA.  The Seventh Circuit noted that ruling in 
favor of the Archbishop would create a general free exercise of religion 
exception to the Bankruptcy Code282 and a “logistical nightmare” for the 
courts.283  It described a classic slippery slope: The court would have to 
consider every section in the Bankruptcy Code, determine whether that 
section substantially burdened a party’s religious beliefs, and then determine 
whether the particular section furthered a compelling governmental 
interest.284 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,285 a 
RFRA case, the Supreme Court characterized this argument as “the classic 
rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, 
I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”286  The Court made 
it clear in Gonzales that RFRA mandates that courts balance on a case-by-
case basis the governmental interests in consistent enforcement of laws 
against the imposition in that case on individuals’ religious liberty.287  It held 
that under RFRA, exceptions from law enforcement to protect free exercise 
of religion do not invariably open an unmanageable floodgate of requests for 
exceptions or fatally undermine the government’s interest in enforcement.288  
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s prediction of doom, the Supreme Court 
in Gonzales expressed confidence that courts are capable of deciding in 
individual cases when the balance tips in favor of protection of religious 
 
 282  Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 748 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“Such an exception would also open up a religious affirmative defense beyond this case to 
all provisions of the Code, so long as that belief is sincerely held.”).   
 283  Id. 
 284  Id.   
 285  546 U.S. 418 (2006) (holding that government failed under RFRA to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against a church 
and its members who used a controlled substance in religious worship).  
 286  Id. at 436. 
 287  Id. at 430 (noting that “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the 
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—
the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”); 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (stating that 
courts must use a case-by-case analysis to determine whether government’s interest in 
uniform application of law is sufficiently compelling to justify a burden on free exercise of 
religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which 
applies RFRA standards to federal and state prisoners’ requests for religious 
accommodations); United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting slippery-
slope reasoning in a case involving a religious group’s assertion of a Free Exercise clause 
exception to the cannabis prohibitions in the CSA). 
 288  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431–36; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 236 
(1972) (recognizing a religious liberty exemption from generally applicable state compulsory 
education laws for Amish children because the state failed to show an impediment to its 
“paramount” interest in education by recognizing an exemption for the Amish). 
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liberty.289 
It remains to be seen how the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Listecki, and 
the split it created with the Eighth Circuit’s holding in In re Young, will 
influence the development of law governing religious liberty defenses to 
bankruptcy law.  Bankruptcy laws do not frequently conflict with religious 
expression, and the specific circumstances of cases where they do will be 
critically important.  For example, compared to the tithes the Eighth Circuit 
protected from fraudulent transfer avoidance in In re Young,290 the transfer 
of $55 million to the Cemetery Trust appeared to be an intentional wealth 
protective maneuver in anticipation of liability for sexual abuse claims, not 
a routine act of religious expression. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Listecki, although broad in its conclusions, can be limited to its unusual 
procedural posture and facts.  Although its impact on the law governing 
religious liberty may be limited, the Seventh Circuit’s decision resolved an 
expensive legal issue in the case, shifted the leverage in favor of sexual abuse 
claimants, and smoothed the way for settlement and confirmation of a 
consensual plan of reorganization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The use of bankruptcy proceedings by Catholic organizations as a 
means to resolve mass tort liability for clergy sexual abuse has been 
remarkably successful.291  For the Catholic diocesan debtors, the price of 
bankruptcy relief has been intense public scrutiny of previously private 
matters, including the external consequences of inter-hierarchical 
relationships prescribed in canon law.  The bankruptcy cases of Catholic 
dioceses have made it clear that Catholic religious organizations are 
significant economic actors in the secular world.  Decisions made within the 
Catholic hierarchy of authority under canon law for internal religious 
purposes have profound external consequences, not only on creditors outside 







 289  Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 436.  
 290  Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th 
Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). 
 291  See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases. 
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APPENDIX A: CASE INFORMATION 
 
























































































































































































































* The corporate name of the Diocese of Fairbanks is Catholic Bishop of 
Northern Alaska, or CBNA, which is listed as the official name of the debtor 
in all bankruptcy court filings. 
** Oregon Province is comprised of Jesuit Communities, many of which are 
not separately incorporated entities. 
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*** St. Paul and Minneapolis, Duluth, and New Ulm are classified as 
“Religious Diocesan Corporations” under relevant state statutory regimes 




APPENDIX B: OUTCOMES OF CASES 
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* San Diego was settled and subsequently dismissed by the bankruptcy court 
on November 16, 2007. 
** The corporate name of the Diocese of Fairbanks is Catholic Bishop of 
Northern Alaska, or CBNA. 
 
